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BRAIN SCIENCE AND THE THEORY OF
JUVENILE MENS REA*
JENNY E. CARROLL**
The law has long recognized the distinction between adults and
children. A legally designated age determines who can vote,
exercise reproductive rights, voluntarily discontinue their
education, buy alcohol or tobacco, marry, drive a car, or obtain
a tattoo. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld such agebased restrictions, most recently constructing an Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence that bars the application of certain
penalties to juvenile offenders and a Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that contemplates an adolescent-based standard of
reasonableness for the Miranda v. Arizona custody analysis. In
the cases of Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, Miller v.
Alabama, and J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court’s
jurisprudence of youth relies on emerging neuroscience to
confirm what the parents of any teenager have long suspected:
adolescents’ cognitive abilities and thought processes differ from
their adult counterparts. Children are different than adults.
In the cases of Roper, Graham, and Miller, the Court recognized
that brain development affects the legal construct of culpability
and should accordingly affect punishment. In the Roper case
line, the Court reasoned that without mature thought processes
and cognitive abilities, adolescents as a class fail to achieve the
requisite level of culpability demonstrated in adult offenders. As
such, juveniles were categorically spared the death penalty and,
in some instances, a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole. Likewise, in J.D.B., the Court concluded
that the reasonableness of a juvenile defendant’s perception of
custody under Miranda v. Arizona must be age appropriate. The
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Court concluded that as a class adolescents had a different
understanding of custodial status than adults. Courts
contemplating the validity of a perception of custody under
Miranda had to account for this difference in their analysis.
To date, the Court has limited the application of this principle to
punishment and consent analysis under Miranda. The logic of
the Court’s decisions, however, applies just as strongly to the
application of substantive criminal law. Likewise, scholars
writing in the field have limited the application of neuroscience to
either the territory staked out by the Court or to objective mens
rea standards alone. The science, however, does not support such
limitations. Just as modern neuroscience counsels against the
imposition of certain penalties on juvenile offenders and an
adjustment of Miranda’s reasonableness analysis, so it counsels
toward a reconsideration of culpability as applied to juvenile
offenders through the element of mens rea. The failure to extend
this jurisprudence of youth to every mental state element
undermines the very role of mens rea as a mechanism to
determine guilt.
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INTRODUCTION
As an element, mens rea serves the critical purpose in criminal
law of differentiating behavior by degrees of culpability. Through
mens rea, acts and harms are placed on a continuum of fault that
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gives accidental conduct the lowest level of fault and deliberate or
premeditated conduct the highest and most blameworthy level of
fault. Mens rea not only draws boundaries between criminal and
noncriminal events, but it cabins those events and assigns punishment
based on the degree of the actor’s culpability.
Inevitably, the inquiry into the state of mind element often
requires a fact finder to contemplate what a defendant was thinking.
Absent a defendant’s disclosure of his own thoughts, fact finders are
often left to infer a mental state from the defendant’s actions. Even if
a defendant offers insights into his mental state, the fact finder must
still weigh the credibility of the defendant’s confession against the fact
finder’s own perception of the world. Whether by the defendant’s
confession or the fact finder’s inference, the calibration of mental
state is filtered through the fact finder’s own thought process and life
experience. This filtering is not without judicial and legal guidance. In
most jurisdictions and in the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), the law
defines mental states and judges offer jury instructions designed to
provide guidance as to the meaning of the mens rea element. Each of
these definitions, however, proceeds from the premise that mental
states are uniform and adult referential. Under this approach, all
thought and thought processes are adult, and the proper analytic
baseline for mens rea is an adult’s understanding of the world.
This Article argues that this one-size-fits-all approach to mens
rea is not only inconsistent with scientific evidence that the cognitive
processes of adolescents differ from those of adults, but also
undermines the purpose of mens rea when applied to juvenile
offenders. As a result, I argue that the mens rea standard as applied
to juveniles should be recalibrated to account for what is now known
about adolescent development.
Such an argument is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions in Roper v. Simmons,1 Graham v. Florida,2 Miller v.
Alabama,3 and J.D.B. v. North Carolina,4 as well as its longestablished jurisprudence of youth. In the Roper trilogy and J.D.B.,
the Supreme Court noted what many have long suspected: children
and adolescents do not engage in the same decision-making processes
as adults. As a result, the Roper line reasons, adolescents may not
achieve the same level of culpability as their adult counterparts, and
therefore are ineligible to receive the death penalty or, in some
1.
2.
3.
4.

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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circumstances, a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. In this, the Court recognized the role of the mental state
element in assessing culpability.5 The Court’s refusal to subject
juveniles to particular punishments was premised on the
acknowledgement that immature thought processes rendered
adolescents less culpable, at least as compared to their adult
counterparts.
This assessment of culpability in the context of punishment
certainly has some idiosyncrasies. Most notably, substantive criminal
law purports not to share punishment theory’s abiding interest in the
potential for rehabilitation or even the probability of reoffense in its
assignment of guilt.6 Despite this difference, the culpability analysis
for punishment and the culpability analysis for substantive criminal
law both purport to judge the defendant’s level of guilt based on what
is known of the defendant’s actions and the harm he caused. In this
calculation, whether in judgment of guilt or punishment, the
defendant’s state of mind matters as it signals a variance in the
defendant’s level of culpability.
The Roper line acknowledged this premise for punishment, and
J.D.B. expanded this premise’s application in the context of Miranda.7
In J.D.B., the Court concluded that it is erroneous to use the same
standard of reasonableness when assessing the juvenile defendant’s
perception of custody for Miranda purposes.8 While these decisions
have been lauded as striking new ground in the context of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence by categorically prohibiting previously
permissible sentences for juvenile offenders—and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by creating an “age appropriate” standard
of reasonableness—they all toed a well-worn path that the Court and
the law more generally had constructed with regard to youth. This
jurisprudence of youth was premised on the acknowledgment that
children were different than adults, and therefore enjoyed a distinct
legal status. Even in the context of sentencing, over a decade earlier,
the Court remarked that the law must recognize that adolescents tend
to be more impetuous, reckless, and immature than adults.9
The Roper line and J.D.B. will undoubtedly be recognized as
watershed moments in the context of Eighth and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, but their greatest significance may lie elsewhere. In
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
See id. at 570–75.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404.
See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993).

94 N.C. L. REV. 539 (2016)

2015]

BRAIN SCIENCE & JUVENILE MENS REA

543

these cases, the Court relied for the first time on scientific studies to
support the doctrine of difference that it had previously staked out
with regard to youth. Using these studies, the Court concluded with
heightened conviction that children think differently than adults, and
that this difference, at least in the context of punishment and
perceptions of custody, signals a need for the application of a
different legal standard to adolescents.
As significant as this pronouncement is, it has remained confined
to punishment and Miranda’s custody analysis. While the Court
significantly expanded its consideration of adolescent thought
processes in J.D.B. to encompass the perception of custodial status,
thus far courts have declined to extend Roper’s and J.D.B.’s analysis
to culpability standards contained in the substantive criminal law
concept of mens rea. This seems odd as the conceptual premise of
these two lines holds equally true in the context of substantive
criminal law. It therefore seems only logical that—just as the Court
has developed a Fourth and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that
recognizes the differences between adult and adolescent thought
processes—so must a parallel jurisprudence evolve around mens rea
and the most basic question it seeks to answer: is the adolescent guilty
in the first place? This Article makes the novel argument that
applying current, adult-based mens rea standards to adolescent
defendants is not only logically inconsistent with the Court’s position
in Roper and J.D.B. and its more global jurisprudence of youth but
that such an application fundamentally undermines the very function
of the mental state element.
The principal goal of this Article is to lay the foundation for the
application of adolescent neuroscience in the sphere of substantive
criminal law. This is an important first step, but it is only a first step
and larger questions inevitably linger. What proof problems would a
juvenile-centric mens rea approach create? How would substantive
defenses be affected? Is such an approach likely to change outcomes?
What does such an approach suggest about the juvenile criminal
system itself? These and other questions are difficult ones, and I look
forward to engaging these lingering questions in future work. While
this Article does not address all of these important issues, it opens an
avenue of discussion that previous scholarship in the area has yet to
address: that what is known about adolescent brain development
must inform our calculation of juvenile mens rea.
In order to achieve the purported function of mens rea, courts
must recognize that an analysis of a state of mind element must
encompass consideration of the distinct processes and capabilities of
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adolescents. In short, the fact finder must view the factual narrative of
the case from the defendant’s perspective. Courts cannot accept on
faith that an adult fact finder will faithfully remember or properly
assign meaning to the actions of adolescent defendants. Instead,
courts must both allow the presentation of evidence on the distinct
thought processes that are the hallmark of normal10 adolescent
development and offer instruction to fact finders to consider these
distinctions in their calculation of the defendant’s state of mind.
While proponents of juvenile neuroscience in the context of the
Eighth Amendment in particular have cautioned against its
premature use in substantive criminal law realms, such caution
undervalues the relevance of the scientific evidence to mens rea and
undermines the value of the mental state element itself. Such caution
is premised on the notion that substantive criminal law’s continued
reliance on adult standards of mens rea remains an appropriate
calibration of adolescent guilt. Whatever limitations the current state
of science suffers, it provides sufficient insight to confirm that
continued use of an adult-centric mens rea standard for juvenile
offenders provides inaccurate insights into the adolescent’s actual
guilt under the law.
I make this argument in four parts. I begin with an examination
of substantive criminal law’s efforts to define culpability in terms of
an actor’s state of mind. In this discussion, mens rea emerges as a
critical element whose articulated purpose is to distinguish and
categorize levels of blameworthiness. In Part II, I turn to the Supreme
Court’s construction of the jurisprudence of youth. Just as the law
classifies youth and assigns legal significance to this classification, so
too has the Court constructed a doctrine around youth generally and
adolescence specifically. In the fortification and expansion of this
doctrine, the Court has increasingly relied on the science of human
development to set the boundaries of juvenile culpability. In Part III,
I consider the emerging scientific evidence surrounding juvenile brain
development and its implications for executive function, in particular
the willingness of adolescents to engage in risky behavior and their
failure to understand the long-term consequences of decisions.
Finally, in Part IV, I conclude that. given the critical role that
substantive criminal law assigns mens rea as the arbitrator of
10. By “normal,” I am referring to the typical range of physical and psychological
development recognized by the scientific literature. See generally Ronald E. Dahl,
Adolescent Brain Development: A Period of Vulnerabilities and Opportunities, 1021
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 1–22 (2004) (describing typical developmental traits during
adolescence).
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culpability, the development of a jurisprudence surrounding youth,
and the emerging body of scientific literature supporting the
distinction between adult and adolescent decision-making processes
and capabilities, the current application of an adult-based mens rea
standard is not only based on a false premise, but undermines the
purpose of the state of mind element itself.
I. MENS REA’S ROLE IN CRIMINAL LAW
At its core, criminal law links notions of culpability and
blameworthiness.11 Though intertwined, these are distinct concepts.
At the most basic level, the actor’s moral blameworthiness is a
necessary prerequisite for state-imposed punishment, though alone it
is insufficient.12 If blameworthiness designates an act as morally
wrong, culpability places that “wrongfulness” on a continuum of fault,
defining and categorizing the actor’s transgression. In this, the
concept of mens rea is critical. Mens rea, or the requirement of a
mental state, seeks to differentiate between acts that are blameworthy
and those that are culpable and therefore deserve punishment.13 In
this determination, the act or even the harm it may have caused is not
enough. The presence or absence of a mental state is the difference
between an accidental or unintentional act and one that deserves
punishment.14 As Justice Holmes famously noted, criminal law pivots
around this distinction: “[E]ven a dog distinguishes between being
stumbled over and being kicked.”15 Holmes’s dog sensed what the
drafters of MPC, and countless legislative bodies, have attempted to
enshrine in statute: an act without a mental state is usually not a
crime.16 The act may still cause harm and may even cross over into the
wasteland of moral blameworthiness, but the absence of a mental

11. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 10.01–.02 (5th ed.
2009); Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on
Which Our Criminal Law Is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REV. 283, 283 (1988).
12. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 127
(2009) (noting that moral blameworthiness is a necessary prerequisite for punishment).
13. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1527 (1992) (arguing
that mens rea is the initial signifier of moral blameworthiness).
14. Even mental states such as recklessness or negligence, which are couched in terms
of a disregard of risk as opposed to knowledge or intentionality, attribute a mental state to
such disregard, rendering the act “more” than a mere accident.
15. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (Dover Publ’g 1991) (1881).
16. See generally Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or
Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21 (2001) (discussing the role of
mens rea given that “[g]enerally, all crimes contain a mens rea or mental state element”).
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state generally renders it nonculpable and thus unworthy of stateimposed punishment.17
While mens rea may be an imprecise caliper, it nonetheless
establishes the threshold between concepts of moral blameworthiness
and culpability.18 Mens rea seeks to sort acts into categories of
culpability with the dual purposes of establishing sufficient culpability
to justify a particular punishment19 while protecting against the
imposition of disproportionate punishment.20 While the Supreme
Court has declined to designate mens rea as a constitutionally
mandated element under the Due Process Clause, it does recognize
that the concept is integral to notions of culpability, justice, and
punishment.21 While strict liability crimes or crimes with no mens rea
requirement certainly exist, they are both in the minority and
generally disfavored.22 The MPC, in fact, requires readers to impose a
mental state requirement in otherwise silent statutes unless the
legislature clearly designates it as a strict liability offense.23
Thus, while proof of all elements beyond a reasonable doubt is
necessary for conviction and punishment, mens rea serves a unique
role, seeking to separate acts that cause harm from those that both
cause harm and implicate the actor as culpable. Mens rea is the
difference between Holmes’ stumble and kick. In this difference, a

17. Not all harm is punished with criminal sanctions. Some harms are treated as
matters of civil liability and incur civil judgments. This Article does not address such civil
punishments or the significance of adolescence with regard to civil judgments, though
certainly one could make parallel arguments given the reliance on mental states to
determine degrees of civil liability.
18. See Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 260–61 (1987)
(arguing that one cannot establish culpability without first linking blameworthiness to a
mental state).
19. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime To Tear the Tag off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533,
1547–48 (1997) (contending that mens rea distinguishes degrees of blameworthiness or the
extent to which offenders should be held responsible).
20. Smith, supra note 12, at 127 (discussing the federal mens rea doctrine that seeks to
exempt morally blameless conduct from punishment and then seeks to establish
culpability in an effort to prevent disproportionate punishment).
21. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (observing that, while a
mens rea element is not required under the Due Process Clause, the idea that a crime
requires intent “is no provincial or transient notion”).
22. Scholars in particular seem especially distrustful of strict liability offenses. See,
e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF.
L. REV. 943, 954–58 (1999) (lamenting the persistence of strict liability offenses); Laurie L.
Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
401, 425–28 (1993) (arguing that strict liability offenses should be severely limited); Francis
B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 n.5, 78–83 (1933) (same).
23. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(1), 2.05(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
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line is crossed and the harm becomes the subject of state attention
and condemnation.
But to unpack this concept is to enter into an amorphous realm
in which ordinary fact finders are asked to engage in the hard task of
discerning what any particular actor was actually thinking. It is to
realize that the very concept of mens rea grows from a bedrock of
assumptions. First, mens rea assumes a baseline understanding of
social norms.24 These social norms designate certain actions as
“wrong” and, therefore, prohibited under the law.25 This assumption
is linked to the concept of “notice” in criminal law. Citizens are not
required to know every law, but they are assumed to know and
understand rules that dictate social interactions.26 A citizen does not
have to know which statute criminalizes homicide and which nuances
distinguish murder from manslaughter, but it is assumed that all
citizens know that they are not permitted to kill one another—at least
not with legal impunity.27
Not unrelated, the doctrine of mens rea further assumes that a
citizen is capable of conceptualizing his actions in the context of these
social norms and expectations. In terms of the distinction between
blameworthiness and culpability, a citizen may well be blameworthy
for a cognitive and volitional act that causes a harm, but the law may
hesitate to attach culpability absent some evidence that the actor had
some understanding that his actions were (or at least should be)
prohibited by social norms.28
This second assumption in turn leads to a third—that a citizen is
a member of social networks that enforce and enhance her
24. LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 17 (2009) (noting that mens rea requires an
understanding of social norms that render actions “wrong”).
25. See id.
26. Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 815, 819–20 (1980).
27. There are exceptions, both in terms of defenses and statutory exclusions, which
serve either to justify or mitigate homicide. Self-defense, defense of others or property,
insanity, diminished capacity, and lack of capacity, among others, are all common defenses
to murder that either reduce the actor’s liability or excuse it all together. See generally
DRESSLER, supra note 11, at §§ 18, 19, 20, 25, 26 (providing an overview of defenses to
criminal acts). Likewise, some jurisdictions provide that particular categories of killing are
outside the scope of criminal statutes. Consider for example Oregon’s statute allowing for
physician-assisted suicide, see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.885 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.), or the designation of state-sanctioned executioners in states permitting
the imposition of capital punishment, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.10 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Spec. Sess. A).
28. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Problems with Blaming, in LAW, MIND AND
BRAIN 127, 127–28 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009).
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understandings of social norms.29 One challenge that arises when the
law is reduced to a static writing is that social norms may shift or
outpace the law’s prohibitions.30 As a result, some laws may fail to
reflect social norms in some or all communities, either over time or
even at their inception.31 The law itself, in seeking to account for this
disconnect, may undergo a series of interpretations either in its formal
enforcement by government actors or in its informal enforcement by
citizens themselves serving as voters and fact finders.32 By maintaining
a connection with social networks, a citizen may come to understand
not only what the law formally prohibits but also the degree of that
prohibition, the culpability that attaches to violating the prohibition,
and perhaps the community-specific exceptions to the prohibition. In
this, the concept of mens rea would seem to assume that a citizen not
only has a singular understanding of social norms and how her actions
fit into the expectations of those norms, but also that a citizen has a
fluid and evolving concept of such norms that allows her to weigh her
own actions in any given situation against society’s malleable notions
of right and wrong.
Despite a citizen’s membership in social networks that facilitate
contextualization of actions, as a doctrine mens rea assumes both that
a citizen is capable of understanding the consequences of his actions
and that he does so in reasonable alignment with his community’s
understanding of such consequences.33 In short, an actor must
understand before he acts both that his action will cause a particular
effect and that there are prohibitions surrounding them. Even if an
actor does not fully understand the potential illegality of his act, he
must understand the harm it may cause and the nature of the act as
unacceptable or criminal in his community. This ability to grasp the
cause-and-effect relationship for any given act is fundamental to
theories of punishment. This in turn requires that defendants are
rational, capable of understanding social norms and choosing to abide
by them or not, and capable of self-reflection.34
29. Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of
Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1996 (2010) (observing that social networks are
necessary to transmit and reinforce norms and to establish concepts of right and wrong).
30. Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury’s Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657, 706 (2012)
(discussing examples of social norms forcing an evolution of statically constructed law).
31. Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 103 GEO. L.J. 579, 588 (2014).
32. Id. at 588–89.
33. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 24, at 17 (arguing that this ability to
understand cause and effect must extend widely across a community).
34. Id. at 17 (“The criminal law presupposes that actors are rational . . . [and] capable
of using reasons to guide their conduct. It also assumes that actors have the capacity for
self-reflection.”).
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Implicit in this assumption is the notion that any given citizen is
capable of making independent choices to abide by or to disregard
social norms and law35 and that these choices will be driven by an
analytic process that takes into account communal values and
restrictions and the actor’s own needs or desires.36 In short, the
concept of mens rea renders an act of disobedience an active one, a
decision not to comply in a world where the norm is compliance.37
Mens rea transforms the decision to break the law into an act of
citizen defiance differentiated by the level of culpability the actor’s
thought processes reflect.
A. Brief History of Mental States
Despite its critical role in establishing culpability, efforts to
define the state of mind requirement have, historically, been
somewhat elusive. Early civilizations defined culpability broadly as
the distinction between accidental and nonaccidental acts.38 Even as
criminal codes advanced and elements dwindled or acts were
decriminalized, the mens rea requirement remained central to notions
of culpability.39 Within the broad rubric of the mental state, legal
distinctions surfaced between degrees of culpability. Acts, and the
crimes they implicated, were defined on a spectrum that spanned
from carelessness to intentionality to premeditation. Along this
spectrum, culpability was judged based on the degree of
blameworthiness calibrated by the actor’s state of mind.40
35. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 281–86 (1947).
36. Green, supra note 19, at 1548 & n.29; Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of
Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719,
744 & n.95 (1992).
37. Jean Hampton, Mens Rea, in CRIME, CULPABILITY AND REMEDY 1, 1 (Ellen
Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990).
38. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 823–25 (describing the relative rarity of strict
liability crimes historically, with most acts or harms requiring the designation of some
mental state in order to merit state-sanctioned punishment).
39. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21 (noting that “an
unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at all”); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens
Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 988 (1932) (describing the evolution of mens rea).
40. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 821–22 (describing Roman and Anglo-SaxonGerman common law, which sought to differentiate among mental states). These
distinctions are not confined to Western or even Judeo-Christian-influenced codes and
appear in a wide array of criminal law and procedure. See RALPH PIDDINGTON, AN
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 345, 349 (1st ed. 1950) (describing nonEuropean societies that differentiated among mental states in the construction of their
criminal law and procedure prior to their contact with Europeans); Robinson, supra note
26, at 850 (noting that Bantu tribesman of South Africa ascertained the mental state of the
accused to determine his culpability and subsequent penalty). But see Klaus-Friedrich
Koch, The Anthropology of Law and Order, in HORIZONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY 300, 316
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Most crimes required a mental state beyond mere negligence or
carelessness. As governments and societies sought to define states of
mind that exceeded negligence, categories proliferated and labels
abounded.41 First, the law began to differentiate between a careless
act and one that demonstrated a higher degree of culpability, but still
hovered somewhere below a desire to cause harm.42 Regardless of the
descriptive label, such actors were distinct from negligent actors—
they harbored knowledge of the harm risked by their acts and elected
to act anyway.43 These “negligent plus” actors had some
comprehension of the risk their behavior posed and yet took the risk
anyway in the hopes of achieving some alternative, presumably
desired, result. This distinction between mental states recognized that
the actor who comprehended the risk and yet acted anyway was
qualitatively distinct from her inattentive or negligent counterpart
and therefore more deserving of punishment.44
Within the canon of American criminal law, an additional
distinction has developed on the continuum of accidental and
nonaccidental acts with the differentiation of “intentional acts.”45 This

(Sol Tax & Leslie G. Freeman eds., 2d ed. 1977) (describing the lack of mental states used
by the Jalé of New Guinea to determine the appropriate punishment for criminalized
acts).
41. For example, beyond the categories of “negligence” or “carelessness,” legal
systems developed categories for “recklessness,” “gross negligence,” and “willful
blindness”—to name a few—which signaled a mental state beyond a failure to recognize a
risk but still below a mental state that intended the harm caused by the act. See Robinson,
supra note 26, at 837–46.
42. See Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1311–12
(2011) (describing the evolution of the “recklessness” mental state in pre-MPC criminal
codes).
43. See ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 22 (B. Thorpe ed., 1840)
(describing early English law, which differentiated between behavior that exceeded
carelessness but was judged “unintentional” nonetheless and the development of the
notion of “negligence-plus”).
44. This distinction also signaled the adoption of a moral philosophy that recognized
that, while it may be necessary or desirable to punish those who disregard known risks,
this punishment should be less severe than punishment given to those who both
understand the risk and intend the harm that accompanies that risk. See Fiery Cushman,
Liane Young & Marc Hauser, The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral
Judgment, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082, 1082–83 (2006) (discussing the tendency to morally
differentiate between harms that are intended and those that are unintended, though
possibly anticipated, consequences of an act); John Finnis, Object and Intention in Moral
Judgments According to Aquinas, 55 THOMIST 1, 1–2 (1991) (describing the development
of moral philosophy that distinguished between unintended and intended acts and
punished each accordingly).
45. See Shen et al., supra note 42, at 1312–13 (describing the development in
American law of a category of culpability within desire-based intention as “recklessnessplus”).
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distinction created a category of mental state acknowledging that an
actor may consciously undertake an act knowing that a particular
harm, though not desired, is virtually certain to occur if the actor
acts.46 This mental state hovers somewhere above recklessness but
below intentionality, occupying a space of “recklessness-plus.”
Finally, in the context of homicide, common law recognized an
additional level of mens rea—“premeditation,” which signals a
heightened level of intentionality.47 In nearly every state, a finding of
deliberation or premeditation is a necessary prerequisite for the most
serious punishment—mere intentional killings simply do not warrant
the most severe category of punishment.48
In addition to designing these degrees of culpability around
particular mental states, the common law also generated defenses
contingent on the establishment of a mental state or its absence.49
Excuse and mitigation defenses offer varying degrees of shelter from
liability, either because the offender is very different from ordinary
actors or the offender is ordinary but acted in response to
extraordinary or aberrant circumstances.50 These defenses consider
how the actor’s mental condition or circumstances affect his thought
process and consequently shape his mental state.51 Some defenses
expressly contemplate the offender’s state of mind or mental capacity
in their construction.
Of these defenses, an insanity defense is the most extreme,
excusing liability based on both the mental condition of the actor and
46. See id. (describing the difference between a reckless state of mind and one that
both comprehends the risk and the virtual certainty of that risk being realized); see also
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 14.4 (4th ed. 2003) (identifying a category of
mental state that encompasses a heightened form of recklessness).
47. See Shen et al., supra note 42, at 1313 (describing the development of mental
states in the context of homicide).
48. Id. at 1313 & n.2. Many states require some form of premeditation or deliberation
as an element of first-degree murder, the highest of the homicide offenses in each
jurisdiction. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187–188 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-51 (2015); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4001 to -4002 (2015); IOWA CODE § 707.2 (2015); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1
(2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1123-1 (2015) (LEXIS through 2015 legislation); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2015); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101
(LEXIS through 2015 Sess.).
49. See generally Sayre, supra note 39, at 1104–16 (describing the historical
development of defenses based on mens rea).
50. See Kadish, supra note 18, at 265 (categorizing excuse and mitigation defenses as
based on either the circumstances the actor faced or the actor’s mental deficiencies or
differences).
51. Id.
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the effect of that condition on her understanding of the wrongfulness
of her act.52 The defense of diminished capacity is similar to an
insanity defense in that both expressly consider an actor’s mental
condition, including possible defects in the calculation of culpability.
A diminished capacity defense, however, mitigates rather than
excuses liability but still takes into account the offender’s state of
mind.53 Likewise, the doctrines of extreme emotional disturbance,
provocation, and heat of passion all recognize that particular
circumstances may affect an actor’s mental state and thereby mitigate
culpability.54 Unlike insanity, these defenses do not completely
insulate the defendant from liability, but rather suggest that she acted
under a different or diminished mental state that warrants
consideration in an assessment of guilt and punishment.55
These mitigation defenses are the most obvious mens rea–based
defenses, but they are not the only ones. The doctrine of self-defense
likewise relies on an assessment of the defendant’s mens rea, though
it does so in a less obvious way.56 While the particulars of the selfdefense doctrine have varied widely throughout its evolution, at its
core the doctrine depends on the fact finder’s determination that the
defendant’s use of force was a reasonable response to the threat he
believed he faced.57 Implicit in this assessment of the defendant’s
reasonableness is an evaluation of what the defendant believed the
situation to be at the moment he calculated his response.58 In short,
52. See id. at 262–63. Note that while states may define insanity defenses differently,
each iteration of the defense relies on the underlying premise that the defendant’s mental
illness or defect precluded his comprehension of either the nature of his act or its
wrongfulness. Id.
53. Id. at 262.
54. See Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 421, 447–48, 447 n.217 (1982) (explaining the
importance of the justification-excuse dichotomy as it pertains to provocation, extreme
emotional disturbance, and heat of passion).
55. See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 296 (2003) (discussing the effect of mens rea–based excuse defenses on
culpability and punishment assessments).
56. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV.
949, 971–80 (1985) (emphasizing the importance of mens rea in self-defense, specifically in
instances where an actor mistakenly believes he is in danger).
57. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“[T]he use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself . . . .” (emphasis added)); see
also DRESSLER, supra note 11, at § 18.01, .05.
58. See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 10 (2003); V.F.
Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1280–87 (2001) (describing
the interplay of imminence and the duty to retreat in the unique context of battered
woman syndrome).
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the fact finder must determine the defendant’s state of mind as it
relates to the perceived threat.59 Thus, while at first blush this defense
would appear distinct from either the concept of mens rea itself or an
excuse defense that relies on the absence of mens rea to mitigate
culpability, in reality, the concept of self-defense is entwined with the
same doctrinal principles used to define the defendant’s state of
mind.60 In this sense, whatever other criticisms one might levy against
this or any other defense, an examination of such defenses is an
instrumental part of the analysis of mens rea’s role as a tell of
culpability.
This common-law evolution of mental states and the defenses
they implicate was hardly linear or precise. As social norms and
expectations shifted, so too did concepts of mens rea.61 Like many
legal standards untethered to particular statutes or rules,62 the state of
59. See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New
Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 195–96, 200 (1998).
As many scholars have noted, this assessment of the defendant’s state of mind is fraught
and complex, frequently hinging on factors such as race, gender, and suspicion that may
taint any analysis of the necessity of a forceful response. See LEE, supra note 58, at 138–46
(noting the effect of race on perceptions of dangerousness); Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the
Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards
of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4 (1998)
(“[C]ourts have slowly come to accept the widespread scholarly belief that the formal
neutrality of the objective standard is systematically biased against the self-defense and
provocation claims of individuals from groups that lack significant economic, political, and
social power in American society—particularly women, the poor, and nonwhites.”);
Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet PostRacial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1580–86 (2013) [hereinafter Lee, Making Race
Salient] (surveying social science studies that demonstrate the effect that implicit racial
bias has on the perception of fear); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense:
Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 402–23 (1996)
(explicating the “Black-as-criminal” stereotype); Nourse, supra note 58, at 1279–80, 1280
n.215 (explaining the debate surrounding the role of subjectivity and gender in homicides
resulting from battered woman syndrome); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The
Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 190 (2001) (“[B]ecause the bias caused by race is
largely automatic, it may be difficult to control directly, especially when cognitive
resources are limited.”); B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and
Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 290 (2006)
(“Race can bias snap judgments of whether a gun is present, and that bias can coexist with
fair-minded intentions.”); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the
Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 314–15 (2012) (observing that individuals rely
on stereotypes when assessing the risk posed by other people).
60. See Nourse, supra note 58, at 1240–42 (exploring the subjective and objective
approaches to self-defense).
61. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 825–30; Sayre, supra note 39, at 988–94.
62. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 621–22 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 67 (1992) (“On this view, standards
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mind element became a mechanism for fact finders to approximate
the justice of verdicts and punishments.63 This may in fact be one of
the great virtues of unattached standards: they demand interpretation
in ways that rules—which cede this power to their drafters—do not.64
In the process, however, definitions inevitably overlapped, conflicted,
or even disappeared altogether.65 Internal debates emerged over
whether mens rea standards should be judged objectively or
subjectively and, as will be discussed in greater detail below, whether
such distinctions were even possible.66
Sadly, the development of the criminal code in the United States
did little to resolve these debates or identify with precision the
meaning of the mens rea requirement.67 The Supreme Court, in
surveying the criminal code, lamented that the mens rea element
produced “disparity and confusion” because it lacked a precise
definition.68 Despite this reality, there was no effort to establish

make visible and accountable the inevitable weighing process that rules obscure.”). For
examples of the use of such legal standards with regard to critical elements of a
prohibition or legal code, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC:
Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 751 (2009) (“A rule, because it
is certain, does not allow for flexibility or substantive equality. It can be over- or underinclusive, and can encourage behavior that is socially irresponsible up to the line it draws.”
(footnotes omitted)); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 190 (2002) (“As an essentially contested concept, [regulatory
takings doctrine] is fertile and generative precisely because it is inevitably, and perhaps
quintessentially, vague and unresolvable. It does not and cannot give clear rules at the
level of generality and simplicity demanded of it.”).
63. See Francis Bowes Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal
Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 401–04 (1934) (illustrating how the concept of
mens rea evolved over time with shifting conceptions of morality).
64. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues
of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1223–25 (2010).
65. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 825–30; Sayre, supra note 39, at 1016–17.
66. See DRESSLER, supra note 11, at § 10.05 (noting that historically, even when a
crime specified a state of mind as objective or subjective, questions remained as to
whether such a state of mind had to apply to every element using the same objective or
subjective standard); John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness:
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1064 (1999)
(describing confusion even at the highest levels over whether mens rea standards were
objective or subjective); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77–
78 (1994) (summarizing the debate over objective and subjective standards and whether or
not these standards apply to all elements of the offense of trafficking in child
pornography).
67. See Kadish, supra note 22, at 947 (calling the state of criminal codes in America
“archaic, inconsistent, unfair, and unprincipled”); Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a
Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1100–01 (1952) (describing the failure of the
judiciary or the legislature to adequately develop criminal law, including the failure to
define mens rea in criminal statutes).
68. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
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general culpability definitions within criminal statutes69—at least not
until the American Law Institute (“ALI”) and Herbert Wechsler
decided to offer uniform mens rea definitions in the MPC.70
B.

The Rise of the MPC and Defined Mens Rea

The MPC divides mens rea into four categories: purposely,71
knowingly,72 recklessly,73 and negligently.74 These categories were
created in an attempt to resolve the conflicts that arose as a result of
the common law’s failure to define mental states. First, while the ALI
retained previous distinctions between purposeful and negligent acts,
it limited the further division of culpability to two additional
categories: knowingly and recklessly.75 Within these categories of
mens rea, culpability was defined either in terms of the actor’s desires
or the risk she took, or both.76 Second, the ALI embedded mens rea
requirements into the definitions of crimes themselves, requiring that
all crimes have, at minimum, both act and mental state
requirements.77 In doing so, the MPC created a methodology for
categorizing and compartmentalizing the significance of the
defendant’s conduct in relation to her understanding and appreciation
of the social norms she was rejecting in the course of that conduct. As
mental states were placed in a hierarchy, punishments were aligned to
69. See Shen et al., supra note 42, at 1315 & n.30 (observing that even as Congress
federalized crime it made no effort to include general mens rea definitions, instead
planting varying degrees of mens rea into specific offenses).
70. See Wechsler, supra note 67, at 1108–10 (identifying one of the fundamental aims
of the MPC as developing a uniform system of culpability by regularizing mens rea
categories).
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“A person acts
purposely . . . when . . . it is his conscious object . . . to cause [a particular] result.”).
72. Id. § 2.02(2)(b) (“A person acts knowingly . . . when . . . he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause [a particular] result.”).
73. Id. § 2.02(2)(c) (“A person acts recklessly . . . when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that . . . will result from his conduct.”).
74. Id. § 2.02(2)(d) (“A person acts negligently . . . when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that . . . will result from his conduct.”).
75. See Shen et al., supra note 42, at 1317.
76. For example, a purposeful mental state turns on the actor’s desire to cause a result
or harm alone. In contrast, the subsequent, and lower, mental states of knowingly and
recklessly consider the actor’s desire to achieve a particular result in relation to his
understanding of the risk that achieving that desired result will entail. For these mental
states, the risk taken and the desired result do not have to align; an actor can desire an
alternative result while still understanding with varying degrees of certainty that he is
taking a risk that another, harmful result will occur. Finally, negligence requires only a
finding that the actor was unaware of a substantial risk of harm when he acted.
77. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 691–99 (1983) (noting
that in defining culpability, the MPC attached a mental state to each element).
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reflect the defendant’s degree of culpability, as opposed to merely the
damage she may have caused.78
Whatever other failings the MPC may have suffered, which I will
discuss below, these two innovations were critical. They sought to
establish continuity among discussions of culpability by offering
generalized definitions of mental states that could be applied across
the code and could be definitively linked, albeit imperfectly, to
notions of culpability as signaled through punishment. While the
MPC has not been adopted by all states, it is influential and has
helped to establish norms for culpability that reflect social
understandings of blameworthiness.79 Perhaps more importantly,
studies suggest that jurors are able to apply some, though admittedly
not all, of the MPC’s categories of mens rea with relative accuracy
and consistency.80 This is important not only because the MPC’s
concept of mens rea creates the uniformity that common law mens
rea lacked, but also because in that uniformity the citizen’s faith in the
system is maintained. As a result, the law is a known entity with
reliable and discernable parameters.
The MPC makes an additional, critical distinction with its
categorization of mens rea: it attempts to differentiate between
subjective and objective mental states.81 Subjective mental states—
such as intentionally and knowingly—ask the fact finder to consider
what the defendant was actually thinking at the time of his action.82
78. While the existence of strict liability offenses suggests that some harms require no
analysis of the defendant’s state of mind in order to warrant punishment, the default
position of the MPC, as it is with most states, is to require a mens rea. In addition, those
crimes designated as strict liability offenses tend to fall into narrow and relatively minor
categories.
79. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 77, at 691–92 (noting that while a majority of
states have adopted the MPC, many have adopted it with changes). Even in states where
the MPC has not been adopted, judges often rely on the MPC’s categorization and
definitions of mental states in their assessments of common law and non-MPC state codes.
See DRESSLER, supra note 11, at § 3.03. In addition, the MPC is “the principal text in
criminal law teaching.” Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code’s Historical
Antecedents, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 521, 521 (1988).
80. Researchers conducting an empirical study found that “most of the mens rea
assumptions embedded in the MPC are reasonably accurate as a behavioral
matter . . . [and] subjects were able to distinguish regularly and accurately among
purposeful, negligent, and blameless conduct.” Shen et al., supra note 42, at 1306. The
authors went on to conclude that “subjects failed to distinguish reliably between knowing
and reckless conduct.” Id. at 1306–07.
81. See John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine,
34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 123 n.73 (1996).
82. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (defining
“knowingly” and emphasizing the actor’s awareness of the circumstances as they exist or
his near certainty of the results of his conduct).
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Put another way, they require the state to prove that a defendant
actually did intend or know with substantial certainty the harm he was
causing at the time of his action. In contrast, the purely objective
mental state of negligence asks the fact finder to consider what a likesituated “reasonable” person would have done in the defendant’s
situation.83 If the designated mental state is objective, the fact finder
considers what the defendant was actually thinking only in
relationship to whether or not this thinking accurately mirrors that
expected from his reasonable fellow citizens. The mental state of
recklessness seeks to meld the subjective and objective approaches,
asking fact finders both to consider what the defendant actually
understood his situation to be, and then to judge whether, based on
this understanding, his actions comported with those of a reasonable
man.84 The MPC uses these mental state designations to differentiate
the defendant’s degree of culpability and so his punishment. The
higher levels of mens rea require a higher degree of proof—that is, a
demonstration of the defendant’s actual state of mind, independent
(in theory at least) of that expected from his fellow citizenry—to
impose a higher punishment. The lower levels of mens rea require the
state to prove less, but they also authorize lesser punishments.
C.

Problems with Mens Rea

While superficially attractive, the MPC’s neat categorization of
mens rea between subjective and objective considerations is
problematic in that these categories belie the realities of the very
process by which they are ultimately applied.85 First, the approach

83. See id. § 2.02(2)(d) (defining “negligently”).
84. See id. § 2.02(2)(c) (defining “recklessly” subjectively as a conscious disregard of
“a substantial and unjustifiable risk” and objectively as a “gross deviation from the
standard of conduct” of a “law-abiding person”).
85. Commentators have focused on myriad other criticisms with regard to the MPC’s
efforts to define mens rea that are less relevant to my own examination of the application
of mens rea standards to juveniles. Having said this, they are worth noting here. Many
have criticized the MPC’s definitions as overlapping so significantly as to be rendered
nearly meaningless in their distinctions. See Kathleen F. Brickey, The Rhetoric of
Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion, and Structural Reform, 84 IOWA L. REV.
115, 122 (1998) (noting extensive overlap between concepts of “purposeful” and
“knowingly”); Michael T. Cahill, Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of Criminal
Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 879, 902 (2007) (noting overlap between categories of
knowledge and recklessness); Shen et al., supra note 42, at 1306–07 (noting the inability of
subjects to differentiate between knowing and reckless categories). Still other
commentators have noted that while the MPC attaches mental states to all crimes, it fails
to designate with any precision to which elements these mental states apply. See Robinson
& Grall, supra note 77, at 714–15 (noting that the MPC indicates only that the state of
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rests on a flawed assumption that mental states can be externally
discerned. Second, and not unrelated, the law permits the state to
prove mens rea through inference. Third, the application of the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard introduces a level of inescapable
juror-dictated objectivity (or perhaps more accurately, juror-dictated
subjectivity) into the calculation of the defendant’s state of mind. I
will discuss each of these problematic effects in turn.
Consider first the entwined dilemma of proof with regard to
mens rea and the defendant’s obscured state of mind. Even if the
MPC’s articulation of mental states accurately reflects social norms
and behavioral expectations, this accuracy does little to inform the
fact finder of what the defendant was actually thinking.86 This, in turn,
spawns a related dilemma: the need to allow proof of mental states by
inference. Even in the face of high confession rates among
defendants,87 the state must frequently rely on circumstantial
evidence and inference to establish the requisite elements, including
the mens rea requirement.88
On one level, such reliance on inference is not only logical but is
necessary for a functioning justice system. Defendants do not always
oblige the state with a confession. Even when a confession exists, the
defendant’s own words may themselves appear suspect to the fact

mind requirement attaches to each “material element” of a crime without noting which
elements are material).
86. Other commentators have addressed this issue extensively, so I will note it as a
dilemma but consider the remaining two reasons more extensively. For discussions of the
problem with treating a mental state as a discoverable condition, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 168 (1990) (lamenting that an issue with
the mental state requirement is that it is impossible to read the minds of criminals); Kevin
Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317,
320–21 (2009); Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental State or What Is Meant by Intent, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 102–07 (2001); Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State
of Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49
HOW. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
87. See Christopher Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism and Police Investigative
Practices, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 321, 336 (2011) (noting that, post-Miranda, an
estimated forty-five to sixty-five percent of interrogated suspects still make incriminating
statements).
88. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 521 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(discussing how the knowledge requirement can be proved through circumstantial
evidence; for example, receipts accepted during a long-term drug-dealing relationship can
prove knowledge of profit in a money-laundering offense), superseded by statute, Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(f)(1), 123 Stat. 1617, 1618
(2009), as recognized in United States v. Grasso, 724 F.3d 1077, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2013);
see also Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330 (1960) (“Circumstantial
evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive
than direct evidence.”) (citing Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)).
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finder or may fail to provide insight into her mental state. Regardless,
the state is still required either to prove a case beyond a reasonable
doubt or to convince a defendant to plead guilty. Without being able
to rely on inferences from circumstantial evidence, prosecutors would
be asked to complete an insurmountable task in many cases,
rendering enforcement of the law more dependent on the ability of
the defendant to keep her mouth shut or, having confessed, to
convince a jury that her words, once spoken, were faulty, than on any
other factor. This in turn might produce an increased incentive for
state actors to procure confessions and, having procured the
confession, to obscure any suggestion of coercion in that
procurement, particularly in high-profile or especially heinous cases.
The specter of forced confessions and unscrupulous methodologies of
police interrogation is sufficiently fresh in the collective memory—if
not an ongoing concern—to suggest that there are social benefits to
allowing such inferences from circumstantial evidence.89
Beyond this, the acceptance of such inferences is also an
acceptance of the very process the jury engages in when it renders a
verdict. Whether or not a case actually goes to trial, an advocate, and
so the defendant, must contemplate how a fact finder will interpret
his actions when overlaid with the law’s proscriptions. Inevitably, this
interpretation will require the fact finder to judge what she believes
the defendant thought based on what the defendant did. Although
the potential inaccuracy of such judgment may temper the
interpretation, it cannot stem it altogether.
Even if the prosecutor is able to produce a legally satisfactory
confession in a case, or if the defendant elects to speak during
colloquy or trial either to protest his innocence or to contest the
state’s account of his case, the fact finder must still apply a beyond-areasonable-doubt standard to reach a verdict.90 The application of the
reasonable doubt standard requires the fact finder to consider the
evidence in the context of the fact finder’s own knowledge and
experience, to interpret the probability of each account, and to
reconcile conflicting or incomplete narratives. In this moment of
89. See Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions,
and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 949–51 (1995) (providing hypothetical
variations on police interrogation tactics based on existing case law). For a more recent
(and pop culture) discussion of this phenomena, see Spencer Ackerman, How Chicago
Police Condemned the Innocent: A Trail of Coerced Confessions, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2015,
12:33 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/19/chicago-police-richard-zuleyabuse-innocent-man [http://perma.cc/A25K-EGLM].
90. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (requiring proof of all elements
beyond a reasonable doubt).
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interpretation, the fact finder inevitably lays each account next to her
own experiences and makes judgments about veracity based on what
seems most likely given what the fact finder knows of, or maybe
hopes for, the world. This moment of interpretation is a fraught
intersection between the law’s procedural and substantive
possibilities.
On the one hand, this moment of interpretation is a communal
reclaiming of the law’s very meaning and identity. Most obviously in
the context of jury trials—but also before appointed or elected
judicial fact finders—the moment the law is applied to the citizen is a
moment when the law ceases to be theoretical and static and becomes
a living and active body in the lives of the citizenry. No matter the
verdict, by going to a jury, the law is interpreted and enforced in a
manner that strives simultaneously to shape and respond to social
norms. The application of the reasonable doubt standard is a complex
and real moment of democracy in which the acceptance or rejection
of the law’s province pivots around the doubt of the fact finder.
But if the procedural possibility of the fact finder’s circumstantial
inferences is great, the substantive possibility is equally complex and
potentially more dire in outcome. As fact finders sift evidence
through their own rubrics of experience and expectation to determine
their level of doubt, they inevitably reduce even the most subjective
of standards to an objective calculus or, perhaps more accurately, to a
subjective calculus based on their own subjectivity rather than the
defendant’s. Acts are judged and minds are read based on each
juror’s expectations fueled by his or her own belief system and
experiences. The purchase of a gun, the stalking of a victim, or the
discussion of a murder will become evidence of premeditation—or
not—because they appear to be so based on what the fact finder
believes those same events would mean in the context of his own life.
No matter how “truthful” a defendant’s counternarrative may be, if it
fails to comport with the fact finder’s own perception of the world, it
risks failing as a defense.91
91. By way of an admittedly anecdotal narrative, consider a case I worked on while a
public defender. I represented a client who had followed a young woman around for
weeks after he met her at a party during his freshman year in college. He sent the woman
hundreds of instant messages and emails, left scores of voice messages for her, and left her
notes on the whiteboard on her dorm room door. When my investigator interviewed the
victim, the victim reported that while finding his behavior “annoying,” she also didn’t see
it as anything more than “a crush” and therefore “harmless.” After my client assaulted the
victim, the State charged him with stalking in addition to the assault. The question was
whether or not his behavior had crossed some line of the social norm of acceptable
“crush” behavior to the level of criminality. To me, an adult who was nearly fifteen years
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Even defenses that seek to explicitly account for the defendant’s
own experiences inevitably require fact finders to weigh that
experience against their own sense of what seems true and what
simply does not. In this, all mens rea is inevitably objective (or at least
is subjective as to each juror) regardless of the standard articulated.
This is surely problematic with respect to subjective mens rea
standards; but even in the context of objective mens rea standards, it
suggests that the notion of a “reasonable” or “neutral” standard
jurors can apply is a myth. In fact, jurors merely overlay their own
decision-making processes onto the defendant’s actions. In the
process, juror bias, fear, and ignorance are inevitably interwoven into
an evaluation of reasonableness.92 The juror’s calculation of the
defendant’s guilt becomes as much a story about what the defendant
did as about the juror’s deceptively complex calculus of what the juror
imagines those actions signify. To find the requisite mens rea is to
assign a meaning to the defendant’s acts or words and to overlay that
assignment with a vision of the law’s own boundaries and
prohibitions. It is to remove the law from the realm of the theoretical
and to place it not only in the context of the defendant’s life but in the
juror’s own life. It is to conceptualize the law in a single moment and
older than my client, the behavior appeared obsessive; but every witness I spoke to who
was within my client’s “age peer” group, including the victim, consistently first expressed
shock that the assault had occurred and second characterized the behavior before the
assault as consistent with “crush” behavior. Several witnesses who were friends of the
victim indicated that this was what happened to “pretty girls” like the victim. When I
obtained access to the victim’s phone and email records, I found that my client had not in
fact communicated with her more than her other friends, male and female. When choosing
a jury for the case, it became important to me to find peers or relative peers for my client.
I therefore asked many questions during voir dire about the use of social media and
electronic communication. In talking to jurors after the case, no one wanted to see himself
or herself as the type of person who would escalate a crush to an assault on a victim, but
there was a divide between folks who were under twenty-five who saw my client’s
communication as within the norm, and folks over thirty-five who thought it was obsessive
and signaled criminal intent. In many ways this case was an outlier in my career. It was the
only time I ran a “just a crush” defense. But despite its admitted idiosyncrasies, the case
highlights a more generalizable principle: the success of a defense hinges on the ability of a
defendant’s story to “ring true” to the fact finder. Put another way, if the defendant’s
narrative is inconsistent with the fact finder’s own experience, then it is more likely to fail.
92. There is a rich and fascinating body of literature surrounding the effect of implicit
and explicit biases on juror calculations of reasonableness. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al.,
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1133–34 (2012) (discussing the
interplay between explicit and implicit biases); Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 59, at
1584–85. See generally, e.g., David L. Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta & Cecilia L.
Ridgeway, A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1389 (2007) (reviewing social science research on implicit gender bias and
arguing for the admissibility of expert testimony on implicit bias in Title VII employment
discrimination litigation).

94 N.C. L. REV. 539 (2016)

562

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

in all moments going forward, and in that conceptualization to decide
if an action, regardless of the harm it may or may not have created,
was criminal, or accidental, or permitted (or ought to be).
In this substantive application, the promise of mens rea as a
precise and uniform mechanism to establish culpability inevitably
disintegrates, implicating not only the proportionality of the
punishment imposed, but also the question of guilt itself. Thus the
element of mens rea remains an important tool for distinguishing
culpability, but in a different way. Mens rea is recognized as a tool
that benefits from fine-tuning,93 and so a new possibility emerges for
this calculation to embrace the realities of an individual actor’s
cognitive processes.
II. THE COURT, THE LAW, AND THE KIDS
With the general concept of mens rea in place, I now consider
the Supreme Court’s development of a jurisprudence of youth. In a
trilogy of cases beginning with Roper v. Simmons, the Court has
sought to create an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence informed by
the age of the offender. The reasoning of this line of cases, while
striking new ground in the context of the Eighth Amendment, draws
on the Court’s previous treatment of the condition of youth. I begin
my examination with the Court’s most recent cases, and then turn to
other, frequently noncriminal contexts in which the Court has
considered the actor’s youth as a critical factor in its legal analysis.
This jurisprudence of youth is premised on the fundamental notion
that juveniles in general—and adolescents in particular—are a distinct
class of actors, and that distinction carries a legal significance.
A. Youth and the Eighth Amendment
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has considered the
intersection of scientific studies of brain development and the law’s
effort to parse culpability in the context of sentencing.94 The Court
93. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea
Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 179 (2003) (“[T]he MPC approach
creates new problems, some rather significant. So a fine-tuning of the MPC approach, at
least, would be worthwhile.”).
94. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (prohibiting the imposition of
mandatory life sentences without parole on juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (barring mandatory life sentences without parole for nonhomicide
offenses committed by juvenile offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005)
(prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21
(2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally
retarded).
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examined questions of sentencing proportionality in light of data
regarding the behavioral and cognitive development of particular
categories of individuals. In each of these cases, the Court concluded
that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment shielded juveniles and the mentally retarded95 from
certain punishments because they lacked the requisite culpability.96
The opinions explained that the identified classes of individuals
suffered a failure or deficiency in decision-making processes so
significant that it raised sufficient questions about their culpability to
render death sentences for both juveniles and the mentally retarded—
and sentences of life without the possibility of parole for most
juvenile offenders—categorically disproportionate to the defendants’
degrees of blameworthiness.97
The Court’s examination of culpability and maturity began in
earnest in 1982, even before the proliferation of longitudinal brain
studies that mapped juvenile brain development. In Eddings v.
Oklahoma,98 the Court noted what every parent has long suspected:
juveniles do not engage in the same decision-making processes as
adults.99 The Eddings Court concluded that not only are juveniles less
mature than adults, but that they are also more vulnerable to negative
influences and outside pressures.100 In reversing the defendant’s death
sentence, the Court reasoned that, from a moral standpoint, it was
impossible to equate the failings of a child with those of an adult.101
Later, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,102 the Court held that the
evolving standards of decency contemplated by Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence barred the execution of defendants who were under the
age of sixteen at the time they committed their offense.103 The Court
95. In Hall v. Florida, the Court adopted a change in terminology from “mental
retardation” to “intellectual disability.” 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). Accordingly, this
Article also employs the term “intellectual disability,” except when quoting from or
referring to the holdings of opinions that use the former terminology.
96. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2475; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at
571–73; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
97. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Graham, 560 U.S. at 78; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70;
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21.
98. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
99. Id. at 115–16 (“Even the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity of an
adult.”).
100. Id. at 115.
101. See id.
102. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
103. Id. at 822–23 (noting that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence had long spoken in
terms of evolving standards of decency); see also, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171,
175–76 (1976) (noting that the evolving standards of decency that drive the Eighth
Amendment analysis are evident from public attitudes, legislative judgments, and the
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held that this category of juveniles should be spared this punishment,
even though it could be constitutionally imposed on an adult, because
these juveniles lacked the experience, education, and intelligence of
adults.104 It noted that juveniles were less capable of evaluating the
consequences of their actions and also more apt to be motivated by
their emotions and peer pressure.105 As a result, the Court concluded
that, even when they engaged in conduct that would otherwise qualify
them to receive the death penalty, such juveniles were not as culpable
as adults, and therefore evolving standards of decency meant that the
Constitution barred their execution.106 In short, according to the
Thompson Court, “[t]he reasons why juveniles are not trusted with
the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult.”107
A year later, in Stanford v. Kentucky,108 the Court seemed to
back off the conclusion, though not the legal standard, that it had
articulated in Thompson. In Stanford, the Court concluded that it was
in fact permissible to execute sixteen-year-old offenders because state
legislatures, not the Court, determined standards of decency.109 The
absence of a clear national consensus prohibiting the application of
capital punishment to juveniles left it to the states to determine the
minimum age for execution.110 Even in this retreat, the Court required
the minimum execution age to be at least sixteen based on its
conclusion in Thompson that the ultimate penalty of death required a
correspondingly ultimate demonstration of culpability—one absent in
those younger than sixteen.111
In 1993, the Court again revisited the question of the effect of
youth on culpability and proportionality of punishment. In Johnson v.
Texas,112 the Court concluded that the age of the offender was a
relevant mitigator in sentencing determinations.113 The Court noted in
particular that “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
practices of other civilized nations); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that
all punishments must be subject to “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society”).
104. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 836–38.
107. Id. at 835.
108. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
109. Id. at 369–71.
110. Id. at 370–71.
111. Id. at 371–72.
112. 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
113. Id. at 368.

94 N.C. L. REV. 539 (2016)

2015]

BRAIN SCIENCE & JUVENILE MENS REA

565

responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young.”114 The Court continued,
“These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions
and decisions.”115 These traits, while rendering the child dangerous
and his decision-making poor, are also transient—and likely to
subside as the child matures.116 As a result, the offender’s youth
should counsel toward leniency and diminish our concept of his
culpability.117
While these early cases did not have the benefit of modern
neuroscientific studies, discussed in greater detail in Part III, and did
not categorically overturn punishments for juveniles over the age of
sixteen, they laid the critical groundwork for the Court’s more recent
decisions linking notions of culpability to cognitive development.
These subsequent cases, and the studies they relied upon, are both a
continuation and confirmation of the line of Eighth Amendment
reasoning the Court began two decades ago: when we speak of
criminal culpability, children are fundamentally different than adults.
In 2002, the Court returned to the question of cognitive
development and culpability in a different context. In Atkins v.
Virginia,118 the Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibited the execution of mentally retarded
persons.119 Atkins overturned the Court’s previous ruling in Penry v.
Lynaugh,120 which had held that the Eighth Amendment did not
mandate categorical exemption from the death penalty for mentally
retarded offenders.121 Penry had held that it was improper to exclude
mentally retarded individuals as a class from achieving the level of
culpability necessary to justify the imposition of the death penalty.122
In Atkins, however, the Court did an about-face; evolving standards
of decency had shifted, rendering the execution of the mentally
retarded excessive punishment and thus in violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.123
114. Id. at 367.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 368.
117. See id. at 367.
118. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
119. Id. at 320–21.
120. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
121. Id. at 338–39.
122. In reaching its holding, the Court stated that “[i]n light of the diverse capacities
and life experiences of mentally retarded persons, it cannot be said . . . that all mentally
retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with
the death penalty.” Id.
123. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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At first blush, Atkins may appear to be an outlier in a piece
about culpability standards among juvenile offenders. After all, the
Atkins Court considered the underlying culpability and resulting
eligibility for execution of those with a diagnosis of a permanently (or
near permanently) deficient intelligence. Unlike juveniles, the
intellectually disabled do not age out of their immaturity or myopic
decision-making processes. Despite this admitted—and from the
perspective of punishment theory, significant—difference, Atkins
nevertheless informed the Court’s subsequent rulings with regard to
juvenile culpability because of its reliance on scientific research.
In Atkins, the Court defined culpability in terms of the offender’s
state of mind, or his inability to achieve the requisite state of mind.124
Intellectually disabled individuals were judged less culpable because
they suffered from a deficient cognitive and behavioral
development.125 Beyond this, in terms of punishment theory, these
mental deficiencies rendered the death penalty ineffective as a
deterrent for the intellectually disabled and inappropriate as a means
of achieving retribution.126 While the Court admittedly did not reach
the question of what an offender’s mental retardation would signal
with regard to his actual state of mind, the Court nonetheless relied
heavily on cognitive and behavioral research to determine that,
despite its early holding in Penry, the Eighth Amendment precluded
the execution of the mentally retarded based on their reduced
culpability as a class.127 Atkins relied on scientific research to establish
a constitutional standard determined not by an individualized analysis
of actors’ abilities or understandings, but by precluding particular
categories of actors from achieving the mens rea necessary to achieve
the highest levels of culpability. This reliance rendered the Court’s
decision in Atkins a critical precursor to the question it would
confront three years later in Roper v. Simmons.

124. See id. at 318 (“[T]here is abundant evidence that [mentally retarded individuals]
often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group
settings they are followers rather than leaders.”).
125. Id. at 316 (noting that mentally retarded individuals are categorically less culpable
than their peers of average intelligence).
126. Id. at 320–21 (“The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon
the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from
carrying out murderous conduct. Yet, it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments
that make these defendants less morally culpable . . . that also make it less likely that they
can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result,
control their conduct.”).
127. Id. at 320–21.
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Like Atkins, the Court in Roper returned to the question of
whether the Eighth Amendment precluded the execution of a
category of individuals—this time, juvenile offenders.128 In Roper,
despite Justice O’Connor’s protestations,129 the Court concluded that
there was no need for an individualized assessment of an offender to
conclude that the death penalty for juveniles was cruel and unusual.130
Citing scientific evidence, the Court stated that the differences
between juvenile and adult offenders were “too marked” and “well
understood” to require individual analysis.131 Juveniles were simply
categorically less culpable than adult criminals.132 Their lack of fully
formed identity,133 their lack of control,134 and their incomplete
cognitive and behavioral development135 all led the Court to conclude
that the behavior of juveniles could not be equated to that of their
adult counterparts.136 And so, as in Atkins, the Court in Roper found
that as a matter of punishment theory, the death penalty failed to
serve its permissible purposes and was therefore constitutionally
prohibited for juveniles.137
In the subsequent cases of Graham v. Florida and Miller v.
Alabama, the Court used similar evidence and logic to conclude that

128. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).
129. Id. at 605–07 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor rejected the majority’s
bright-line rule and instead distinguished Roper from Atkins. Id. O’Connor deemed
mental retardation and age classifications for minors incomparable, arguing that mental
defects, unlike age, render attaining the requisite degree of culpability for the death
penalty highly unlikely. Id. She instead urged that age be considered only as a mitigating
factor. Id.
130. Id. at 572–73 (majority opinion).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 567.
133. Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)).
134. Id. at 569 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason
of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
135. Id. at 569.
136. Id. at 570.
137. Id. at 571–72. The Court engaged in an extensive analysis of whether the death
penalty could serve a deterrent or retributive purpose for juveniles, reasoning that the
Court had already concluded in Atkins that the death penalty could not serve a deterrent
or retributive purpose for mentally retarded individuals. Id. While this discussion was
admittedly critical to the Court’s analysis in both cases, it is only tangentially relevant to
my argument. Unlike the Court that wondered whether those with diminished cognitive
and behavioral developments could achieve the level of culpability necessary to warrant a
particular sentence, I am interested in whether one of those classes of individuals, juvenile
offenders, can achieve the mens rea element necessary to commit the crime in the first
place. As I will discuss in Part IV, these are distinct questions, but the Court’s analysis
with regard to culpability in the context of sentencing is helpful nonetheless in thinking
about culpability and the concept of mental states.
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sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole for nonhomicide
offenses after a sentencing hearing138—and automatically for
homicide offenses139—violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment. Like in Roper, the Court in both
cases rejected the states’ arguments that sentencing courts adequately
considered the individual juvenile’s culpability in imposing
sentencing.140 Instead, the Court concluded that the punishments were
categorically inappropriate for juvenile offenders given scientific
knowledge of juvenile decision-making processes and cognitive
development. In Graham, the Court acknowledged that while
“[c]ategorical rules tend to be imperfect, . . . one is necessary here.”141
The Court noted that juveniles suffer a “lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” and that as a whole they “are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure.”142 The Court went on to state that
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.143 For
example, the parts of the brain involved in behavioral control
continue to mature through late adolescence.”144 In short, the Court
concluded that certain punishments were inappropriate given the
138. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
139. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). In Miller, the Court declined to reach the question of
whether or not life without parole categorically violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, having decided that the system before it,
which automatically sentenced juveniles to life without parole upon conviction of certain
felonies, was unconstitutional. Id. at 2469. As a result, the two cases stand in odd contrast
on some levels. Graham would seem to suggest that the sentence of life without parole
fails to achieve the goals of punishment given what is known about the nature of juvenile
brain development (as discussed below). See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–72. Yet, Miller
declines to hold the sentence to be categorically inappropriate, leaving open the
possibility, as the dissent suggests, that some juvenile, despite the deficient level of
culpability accompanying his status as a minor, might nonetheless “deserve” such a
punishment. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Outside of the Court’s
generalized reluctance to avoid reaching questions not before it, these holdings strike me
as somewhat odd, if not inconsistent. While worth noting, this is beyond the scope of this
paper. The Supreme Court heard arguments during the October 2015 term in a case
addressing whether Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life without parole sentences for
juveniles applies retroactively. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546, 1546 (2015).
140. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69.
141. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
142. Id. at 68 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)).
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Brief for American Medical Ass’n & American Academy of Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 15, Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2009) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621); Brief for the American Psychological
Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22–27, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621)).
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inability of the juvenile defendant to achieve the requisite level of
culpability because of the effect of his age upon his cognitive
development.
B.

The Jurisprudence of Youth

While these most recent Eighth Amendment cases struck down
previous decisions, they hardly broke new ground. Each of these
cases follows a doctrinal principle articulated in other areas of the
law: that immaturity may trigger legal protections, restrictions, or
both for children that the law does not impose on adults.145 As the
Court itself noted in Roper, juveniles cannot vote,146 serve on juries,147
or marry without parental consent.148 Additionally, they cannot
consent to sexual intercourse.149 In many states, juveniles cannot
terminate a pregnancy without parental or judicial consent.150 And
145. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982). Although the Court
declined to categorically prohibit the execution of minors, it noted:
Youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our
history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their
earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults.
Id.
146. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, app. B at 581–83 (2005) (listing state statutes
establishing a minimum age to vote).
147. See id. app. C at 583–85 (listing state statutes establishing a minimum age for jury
service).
148. See id. app. D at 585–87 (listing state statutes establishing a minimum age for
marriage without parental or judicial consent).
149. See State v. Granier, 99-3511, p. 6 (La. 7/6/00); 765 So. 2d 998, 1001 (explaining
that statutory rape statutes are premised on the belief that juveniles are not mature
enough to understand the consequences of their actions); see also Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981) (chronicling the interests of the state in
deterring underage sexual activity); Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1087 (Fla. 1994)
(noting that the state has an obligation to protect children from sexual activity); People v.
Dozier, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (N.Y. 1980) (listing concerns that include “[f]orced
marriage, unwed motherhood, adoption, abortion, the need for medical treatment and
precipitate withdrawal from school”); State v. Barlow, 630 A.2d 1299, 1300 (Vt. 1993)
(finding similar interests to create a compelling state interest in protecting children from
sexual activity). See generally LAFAVE, supra note 46, at § 17.4(c) (providing a discussion
of the policies behind statutory rape as a means of protecting those incapable of
consenting due to their youth); Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability,
and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 334–57 (2003) (comparing
statutory rape statutes and justifications across states).
150. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 326–28 (2006)
(holding that parental notification requirements posed no undue burden on minor seeking
an abortion so long as there was an exception for the health of the mother); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding as
constitutional a judicial bypass option that required an unemancipated minor seeking to
terminate a pregnancy to provide her own informed consent and the informed consent of
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while judicial151 and legislative152 trends grant minors comparatively
more access to contraception without parental consent than to
abortion, in 2006 the Food and Drug Administration deviated from
this trend and limited access to Plan B for minors.153 Likewise,
juveniles cannot obtain tattoos or ear piercings without their parents’
permission, or, in some jurisdictions, at all.154 They cannot buy
tobacco products155 or alcohol156 or, in some jurisdictions, even be

one parent or guardian); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506–09
(1990) (upholding significantly burdensome judicial bypass procedure for minor seeking
an abortion without parental approval); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44, 647–48
(1979) (holding that parental consent for abortion was permissible as long as the state
provided a judicial bypass mechanism that would allow a minor to have an abortion
without notifying her parents upon a showing that she was sufficiently mature to make
such a decision and that the abortion was in her best interests).
151. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (plurality opinion) (noting that the “law affords
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to . . . contraception”); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693–94 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down
blanket parental consent requirement for minors to receive contraception); Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74–75 (1972) (holding that while
minors have a similar due process right to privacy, “the State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults” though there must be a
“significant state interest . . . not present in the case of an adult” to justify increased state
burdens on minors’ privacy rights).
152. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services to establish programs to “offer a broad range of acceptable
and effective family planning methods and services”); J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, From Age of
Consent Laws to the “Silver Ring Thing”: Regulating Adolescent Female Sexuality, 16
HEALTH MATRIX 151, 163–65 (2006) (noting that in 1978 Congress specifically amended
Title X to require recipients of federal family planning funds to provide services to minors
and that repeated efforts to amend Title X to require parental consent for minors to
receive contraception in federally funded clinics have failed).
153. Letter from Steven Galson, Dir., Ctr. Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, to Joseph
A. Carrado, Vice President Clinical Regulatory Affairs, Duramed Research, Inc. (Aug. 26,
2006),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2006/021045s011ltr.pdf
[http://perma.cc/H3BW-6S66]; see also Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Shifts View on Next-Day
Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at A1 (discussing FDA’s decision to lift restriction upon
over-the-counter access to Plan B—known as the “day-after” or “next-day” pill—for those
over eighteen). The decision represented a significant shift from FDA and federal
legislative policies making contraception available to all women of childbearing age,
including minors. See generally Anna Pikovsky Krishtul, The FDA’s Recent About-Face:
Plan B Age Restriction Is Unlawful Rulemaking and Violates Minors’ Due Process Rights,
81 TEMP. L. REV. 303, 327–28 (2008) (discussing why the FDA’s initial age restriction for
over-the-counter day-after pills should be struck down on due process grounds).
154. See Inna Volkova, Body Art on Children’s Bodies: Should It Be Up to Parents To
Decide?, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 109, 116–17 (2012) (describing laws that limit or
restrict a minor’s ability to receive body piercings or tattoos).
155. See Jennifer McCullough, Lighting Up the Battle Against the Tobacco Industry:
New Regulations Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 710 n.7
(1997) (compiling a list of state regulations that criminalize the possession of tobacco
products by minors). Likewise, it is illegal to sell tobacco products to minors. Prohibition
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present in locations where alcohol is served.157 Juveniles cannot join
the military158 or voluntarily discontinue their educations.159 They
cannot be elected to Congress160 or the presidency.161

of Sale and Distribution to Persons Younger Than 18 Years of Age, 21 C.F.R. § 1140.14(a)
(2015).
156. See National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, 98 Stat. 435
(1984) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012)) (requiring that in order to receive
highway funds, states must prohibit persons under twenty-one years of age from
purchasing or publicly possessing alcoholic beverages); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS 1980, at 116–17 (1981)
(summarizing the state trend of establishing a legal drinking age between eighteen and
twenty-one prior to the passage of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act); FRANKLIN
E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 3–6 (1982) (same).
157. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.48 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Spec. A Sess.)
(prohibiting minors from entering establishments whose primary purpose is the sale of
alcohol); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.141 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2015, No. 130)
(same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.21(1) (McKinney 2008) (same). Some states even prohibit
minors from entering establishments of “ill repute.” See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
140, § 179 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 68 of the 2015 1st Annual Sess.) (establishing
eighteen as the legal age to enter pool halls that display scandalous images); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-5-11 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting minors from entering a pool
hall unless an individual municipality determines otherwise); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 15404
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 39) (setting legal age “to play any game
of billiards, pool, or bagatelle” at eighteen). For further discussion of this issue, see
Lawrence A. Vanore, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary
Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 777–78 (1986).
158. 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2012) (setting the age of conscription without written consent
of a parent or guardian at eighteen). It is worth noting that while minors may not join the
military, they are nonetheless recruited for the military before reaching the age of
majority. See Lila A. Hollman, Children’s Rights and Military Recruitment on High School
Campuses, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 217, 222 (2007) (noting that Congress has
set in place certain restrictions on the recruitment of minors, but that such recruiting is still
an integral part of U.S. military policy).
159. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 20-33-2-6 (2015) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)
(mandating school attendance for children between the ages of six and sixteen, though
making provisions for nontraditional and nonpublic schools); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 3205(1)(a), (3) (McKinney 2009) (requiring children to attend school until the age of
sixteen, though a child who is seventeen and unemployed may still be required to attend
school under the statute). See generally LAWRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM F. AIKMAN,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE (1980) (surveying state
compulsory attendance laws). Such compulsory attendance laws are not without
controversy. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (striking down
Wisconsin’s compulsory attendance laws and noting that “a State’s interest in universal
education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925) (striking down an Oregon compulsory attendance statute on due process
grounds).
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (limiting the age of representatives to twenty-five years
or older); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (limiting the age of senators to thirty years or older).
161. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (restricting the age of the President to thirty-five years or
older).
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Minors are not prohibited from executing contracts, but as a
general rule, contracts made by minors are voidable.162 Likewise,
minors have a right to acquire and to own property, but the law
presumes the minor incapable of managing the property himself; for
that she must seek out the assistance of an adult, often courtappointed, guardian.163 Minors cannot initiate or defend against
lawsuits.164 They cannot even declare themselves emancipated from
their parents without first demonstrating to a court that they are the
“exceptional juvenile,” or perhaps that their home situation is
sufficiently dire that they should be allowed to deviate from the norm
and remove themselves in the interests of their very survival.165
In other contexts, the Court has acknowledged juveniles’
particular vulnerability by subjecting them to the patronizing
162. See In re Bierman, 271 F. Supp. 774, 775–76 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (recognizing that
minors may execute contracts, but that such contracts are generally voidable); Jones v.
Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 373 (Colo. 1981) (same). Several courts have also held that upon
breach the minor was responsible for damages under the contract only for the
consideration she received, concluding that such a rule was necessary to protect minors
from their own indiscretion and immaturity. Nelson v. Browning, 391 S.W.2d 873, 877–78
(Mo. 1965); Hamrick v. Hosp. Serv. Corp. of R.I., 296 A.2d 15, 18 (R.I. 1972); Halbman v.
Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 564–65 (Wis. 1980).
163. See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 651, 653 (M.D.N.C. 1955) (holding
that while children have a right to acquire property, a guardian should be appointed by the
court to manage the property, even over the child’s objection, absent a demonstration that
the child is competent to manage the property on his own); Bach v. Long Island Jewish
Hosp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (noting that a minor may not alter the
status of his property rights without guardian or court approval).
164. See Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958) (holding that a
court may decline to appoint an adult representative or guardian to handle a child’s legal
matters only if it makes a judicial determination that the child is protected without
appointment). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outline the procedure for identifying
the representative or for appointing a guardian to protect the interest the child is
presumed incapable of preserving on her own. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
165. Emancipation is the process by which children acquire legal responsibility and
freedom for themselves, despite their continued biological reality as minors. See LAUREN
KROHN ARNEST, CHILDREN, YOUNG ADULTS, AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 117
(1998) (defining emancipation as the “procedure by which a minor may become
independent of his or her parents before reaching the age of majority” such that “[a]
parent no longer has any right to control an emancipated child’s life or to receive the
emancipated child’s earnings or services” and “the child no longer is entitled to parental
support”); Jenny E. Carroll, Rethinking the Constitutional Criminal Procedure of Juvenile
Transfer Hearings: Apprendi, Adult Punishment, and Adult Process, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
175, 177 n.4 (2009) (describing emancipation as the process by which children eschew their
legal identity as minors and establish themselves as “adults” in the eyes of the law); see
also Cheryl Dalby, Gender Bias Toward Status Offenders: A Paternalistic Agenda Carried
Out Through the JJDPA, 12 LAW & INEQ. 429, 453–54 (1994) (discussing various legal
benefits provided by emancipation); Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper
v. Simmons: “Kids Are Just Different” and “Kids Are Like Adults” Advocacy Strategies, 6
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 273, 315 (2008) (same).
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ignominy of state-imposed curfews166 and protecting them from stateimposed prayers at graduation ceremonies167 or high school football
games.168
Recent decisions in the realm of substantive and procedural
criminal law further expand the jurisprudence of youth. In 2011, a
year after the Court’s decision in Graham and the year before Miller,
the Supreme Court once again considered brain science—this time in
the context of the Miranda169 custody analysis.170 In J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, the Court held that the test for determining whether or not
a juvenile was in custody or was free to terminate contact with the
police must be evaluated based on what was reasonable for a juvenile,
rather than what was reasonable for an adult.171 The case concerned
J.D.B., a thirteen-year-old middle school student who was removed
from class and interrogated in a closed-door conference room by four
adults, including a uniformed police officer and School Resource

166. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1256–57 (M.D.
Pa. 1975) (holding no constitutional violation for a curfew ordinance affecting minors
under the age of eighteen); In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)
(upholding curfew imposed on minors); City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126, 128
(Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (same); Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors’ Fundamental Rights:
Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1163–64 (1984); Comment,
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76 MICH. L. REV. 109, 126, 129, 132, 137
(1977). But see James C. Howell, Barry C. Feld & Daniel P. Mears, Young Offenders and
an Effective Justice System Response: What Happens, What Should Happen, and What We
Need To Know, in FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL
CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION 200, 219 (Rolf Loeber & David P.
Farrington eds., 2012) (“Despite clear developmental differences between adolescents and
adults, the Court and most states’ laws do not provide youths with additional procedural
safeguards to protect them from their own immaturity and vulnerability.”).
167. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1991). In Lee, the Court noted that the
First Amendment must be especially vigilant in separating church and state in the context
of minors. See id. at 592. In disallowing a prayer delivered during a high school graduation
ceremony, the Court cautioned that “adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from
their peers towards conformity, and that . . . influence is strongest in matters of social
convention.” Id. at 593.
168. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000). In Santa Fe, the
Court again noted the vulnerability of children to peer pressure as distinguished from
adults. Id. at 311–12 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1991)). As a result, while
prayers had been upheld in other contexts involving adult-only, or near-adult-only
gatherings, see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983), prayers offered at school
events, even extracurricular ones, violated the First Amendment, Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at
312.
169. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that prior to
questioning, a suspect in police custody “must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed”).
170. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398, 2402–05 (2011).
171. Id. at 2402–03.
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Officer.172 At trial, J.D.B. moved to suppress statements made during
the interrogation on the grounds that he had not been administered
the Miranda warnings.173 In response, the State successfully argued
that J.D.B. was not in custody because a reasonable person would
have felt free to leave the conference room; therefore no Miranda
warnings were necessary.174 Writing for the majority, Justice
Sotomayor reasoned that a child suspect’s age was relevant to
determining whether or not he reasonably believed he was free to
leave and so was relevant to the necessity of the Miranda warnings.175
Citing brain science data similar to that discussed in Graham,176 the
Court noted that the risk of coercion is “all the more acute” during
youth.177 Accordingly, law enforcement officers and courts must take
the suspect’s youth into account in determining whether or not
Miranda should be administered.178
From prayers before high school football games, to the sale of
alcohol, to the custody analysis for Miranda, the list goes on, in
competing (and at times seemingly contradictory) iterations. But in
the end all the restrictions and protections acknowledge a
fundamental reality that we all seem to know and accept, and that the
study of the brain has now confirmed: children are different than
adults.
III. THE SCIENCE OF ADOLESCENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR
CULPABILITY
But what exactly does the scientific evidence show? In the last
two decades a burgeoning body of scientific data has emerged that
has bolstered the Court’s recent decisions regarding adolescent
culpability in the context of sentencing. This literature provides
critical insights into the thought processes and cognitive abilities of
adolescents.
I will begin the discussion of this scientific evidence with a brief
overview of the juvenile justice system and its articulated and
divergent goals. While not all juveniles are tried in the juvenile court
system—indeed the continuing trend is to try juveniles in the adult
court system—the creation of an independent juvenile system itself
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 2399.
Id. at 2400.
Id.
Id. at 2406.
Id. at 2402–03.
Id. at 2401.
Id. at 2404, 2407.

94 N.C. L. REV. 539 (2016)

2015]

BRAIN SCIENCE & JUVENILE MENS REA

575

signals a recognition that youthful offenders are categorically
different from adult offenders. Juvenile systems have cabined the
effect of this acknowledged difference primarily to the provision of
pretrial services and modified sentencing regimes.179
With some knowledge of the juvenile justice system in place, I
turn from the system to the scientific literature. The studies vary
widely, but, as a general principle, they conclude that adolescents as a
class operate under a comparatively reduced capacity when it comes
to higher executive function, including autonomous choice, risk
perception, self-management, and calculation and comprehension of
future consequences.180 This deficiency not only renders adolescents
more likely to engage in risky behavior than adults, but also to have a
more myopic understanding of the external effect of that behavior
than adults.181 Perhaps more significantly these studies conclude that
this deficiency is the norm, not an aberration, in the adolescent
population.182 In other words, unlike evidence of a mental defect or
abnormality that supports a reduction in culpability because of its
very deviation from the norm, evidence of adolescent thought
processes establishes an appropriate mens rea baseline that differs
significantly from the adult perspective criminal law has come to rely
on. In Part IV, I will explore further what this suggests for a mens rea
analysis.
Psycho-social literature explains that adolescence is a transitory
period in which the individual’s very identity and character develop
and coalesce.183 As a result, adolescents are more prone than adults to
engage in explorative and experimental behavior that seeks to test or
push previously established social boundaries—including legal ones.184
The transitory nature of the development period, however, suggests
that such behavior will usually dissipate as the adolescent ages and

179. Carroll, supra note 165, at 183–84, 187, 190 (discussing the development of the
juvenile justice system as a means to address the needs and challenges of juvenile
offenders).
180. See infra notes 203–49 and accompanying text for a description of these studies.
181. See sources cited infra note 215.
182. See B.J. Casey & Kristina Caudle, The Teenage Brain: Self Control, 22 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 82, 82–83 (2013); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg,
Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 802 (2003).
183. See Peter Smith, Social Development, in PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH 310–12 (Michael Eysenck ed., 1998).
184. B.J. Casey, Rebecca M. Jones & Todd A. Hare, The Adolescent Brain, 1124
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 111, 119–21 (2008) (describing the period of adolescence as
characterized by efforts to test and exceed previously created social and legal boundaries).
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develops into an adult.185 In short, youthful offenders do not always or
necessarily become adult offenders.
A second, more recent body of scientific literature builds on
these psycho-social conclusions, examining the biological and
neurological realities of the adolescent development period.186 Such
studies suggest that there may be a biological explanation for the
behavior described in the psycho-social literature, offering a more
nuanced examination of how the physical maturation that occurs
during adolescence may affect social maturation and executive
function.187
At the end of the day, the literature surrounding adolescent
development reveals that teens engage in a different decision-making
process than adults on a variety of levels. This difference is peculiar to
adolescents and affects their understanding of choices and
consequences, including those that may carry legal implications. As a
result, these studies are relevant not only to a calculation of
proportional punishment as it relates to the youthful actor’s
culpability, but also to calculations of mens rea as a signifier of
culpability.
A. The Juvenile Justice System
In many ways, the creation of a separate system to adjudicate
juvenile offenders at the turn of the twentieth century was the
product of the reform movement that recognized the difference
between adults and juveniles even before the scientific literature had
begun to define the parameters and sources of that difference.188 At
185. See Smith, supra note 183, at 313.
186. See infra notes 229–43 and accompanying text describing such studies in greater
detail.
187. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: What Changes, and
Why?, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51, 57 (2006) (“My argument is that heightened risk
taking during this period is likely to be normative, biologically driven, and inevitable.”).
188. See generally JANE ADDAMS, THE SPIRIT OF YOUTH AND THE CITY STREETS
(1910) (discussing the reform movement and its creation of a juvenile justice system
distinct from the adult criminal court system); JACK M. HOLL, JUVENILE REFORM IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA: WILLIAM R. GEORGE AND THE JUNIOR REPUBLIC MOVEMENT
(1971) (same). The movement defined youth in narrower terms than we do today, setting
the age of majority at fourteen or sixteen, as opposed to eighteen, and seeking to prevent
seven- to fourteen-year-olds from being tried as adults. See Julian Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 108–09 (1909) (describing the jurisdiction of juvenile courts
and noting that offenders aged out of the juvenile system at fourteen or sixteen depending
on the state). This focus on relatively younger children may well have facilitated early
reformers’ arguments that juvenile offenders were not fully developed human beings and
therefore should not be subjected to state-imposed punishment for bad acts in the same
way as similarly situated adult offenders.
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its inception, this new juvenile justice system was premised on the
notion that children were different than adults, even when they
engaged in “adult-like” criminal behavior. Early juvenile justice
systems focused on rehabilitation rather than punishment and took
the view that criminal conduct in children was a symptom of poverty
and poor parental supervision.189 The immaturity of the offender was
important to the focus on rehabilitation. Not only did immaturity
indicate a difference in capacity from adult defendants,190 but it also
signaled a corresponding reduction in the level of culpability that
required alternative procedures for assessing guilt and sentences.191
As the procedures and purposes of the juvenile court system
shifted with the Court’s decision in In re Gault,192 so too did the

189. See CHARLES LARSON, THE GOOD FIGHT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BEN B.
LINDSEY 34 (1972) (describing the desire to “treat” juvenile offenders rather than punish
them); MURRAY LEVINE & ADELINE LEVINE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HELPING
SERVICES: CLINIC, COURT, SCHOOL, AND COMMUNITY 155–229 (1970) (noting that early
juvenile justice systems were based on social help models designed to alleviate the harm of
poverty that led to juvenile crime); BEN B. LINDSEY & HARVEY J. O’HIGGINS, THE
BEAST 92, 97 (1909) (expressing the belief that juvenile offenders suffer a “condition” that
requires treatment, not punishment); Mack, supra note 188, at 115, 119–20 (acknowledging
rehabilitation, as opposed to punishment, as the main goal of budding juvenile justice
systems). The early juvenile court system was viewed as a means of diverting youths from
a criminal career through rehabilitation. See id. at 109–10. Without this intervention, it was
believed that youthful offenders would continue towards increasing violence and
heightening criminality. See id. (suggesting that without rehabilitative intervention,
criminal conduct would continue as the child aged into adulthood).
190. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV.
691, 694 (1991) (“By the end of the nineteenth century, children increasingly were seen as
vulnerable, innocent, passive, and dependent beings who needed extended preparation for
life.”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
137, 142–43 (1997) (noting that under rehabilitative models “[j]uvenile offenders were
assumed to have different capacities and needs from adults” and that this “warranted
separate adjudicatory procedures and a differential correctional response”).
191. See ZIMRING, supra note 156, at 36 (“The child’s immaturity was viewed as
outweighing crime control considerations in determining appropriate responses to young
persons who violated the law.”); Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders To
Be Punished: Some Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182, 191
(1989) (“The juvenile court movement assumed that young people under an articulated
statutory age (sometimes as high as 21 years of age) are incapable of rational decision
making and thus lack the capacity for moral accountability assumed by the punitive
model.”).
192. See 387 U.S. 1, 74 (1967) (extending criminal procedural rights to juveniles in
delinquency proceedings). In the process of extending some criminal procedural rights to
juveniles the Gault Court and the later Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), undid
some of the unique aspects of juvenile court. Mary Beth West, Note, Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction over “Immoral” Youth in California, 24 STAN. L. REV. 568, 569 (1972)
(describing what was only the beginning of the erosion of juvenile court jurisdiction
following the Gault and Winship decisions). In the process, the focus of the juvenile justice
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premise that the juvenile system should rehabilitate youthful
offenders and thereby save them from a life a crime.193 As the juvenile
system increased its procedural resemblance to its adult counterpart,
so too did it increase its reliance on punitive sentencing regimes that
sought to hold young offenders accountable for their actions.194 In
short, during the “new,” post-Gault era of juvenile justice, while the
offender’s youth and immaturity may still have factored into
sentencing,195 juveniles were viewed as having the requisite moral
judgment and self-control to be held responsible for their criminal
acts like their adult counterparts.196 Minors were still viewed as less
blameworthy than adults due to a variety of developmental factors,197
but the focus of juvenile systems shifted toward public protection and
the need for punishment.
In the past two decades, this trend produced a juvenile system
less likely to assert jurisdiction over adolescents who commit violent

system shifted from that of a reform movement, towards a criminal proceeding not unlike
its adult counterpart. See id.
193. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 190, at 145 (noting that post-Gault there was
“mounting skepticism about the empirical premise that rehabilitation was effective with
youthful offenders” and a “growing belief that juveniles are more like adults” than the
juvenile system had previously recognized).
194. States altered juvenile codes to reflect a shift from a rehabilitative model for
juvenile offenders towards one based on accountability and retribution. See, e.g., OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.354 (LEXIS through 2015 legislation); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.010(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
195. I do not mean to suggest that juveniles were treated entirely equally to their adult
counterparts in the post-Gault juvenile justice system. Indeed, juveniles still received
shorter sentences under the post-Gault juvenile justice system out of a recognition that
children have “unique physical, psychological, and social features.” INST. OF JUDICIAL
ADMIN., AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
SANCTIONS § 1.1(d) (1980).
196. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARDS YOUNG
OFFENDERS 7, 79–80 (1978). Zimring has also observed that punishing juveniles was used
as a mechanism to force them to take responsibility for their choices and prepare them for
adulthood. ZIMRING, supra note 156, at 89, 90, 95–96 (describing adolescents as having a
“learning permit” for adult life and therefore requiring sanctions to instruct them as to the
negative consequences of decisions).
197. The juvenile system still continued to view minors as more impulsive, less capable
of self-control, inexperienced, and more subject to peer pressure. See ZIMRING, supra note
196, at 7 (noting that adolescents are “more vulnerable, more impulsive and less selfdisciplined than adults” and “may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think
in long-range terms than adults”). In addition, juvenile courts continued to recognize that
youth were more prone towards risk taking, rebellion, and experimentation. Id. at 3. These
developmental factors led courts, and the states, to conclude that adolescent behavior was
generally less culpable than adult behavior, even as punitive models shifted away from
rehabilitation and towards punishment. Id. at 80.
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offenses or who are repeat offenders198 and more likely to impose
sentences commensurate to those imposed on adult offenders.199 Until
the Court’s pronouncement in Roper, even as courts took youth into
account as a mitigating factor, juveniles were still treated as nearly
indistinguishable from their adult counterparts and sentenced
accordingly.200 Even Roper and its progeny, while focusing on the
documented differences between adult and juvenile offenders,
confined the impact of this difference to an assessment of culpability
for sentencing.201 The designation of criminal culpability contained in
the mens rea element of the offense remains untouched by the Roper
line of cases. Whatever immaturity a youthful offender suffered and
whatever corresponding sentencing mitigation this may warrant, his
guilt was, and is, still determined using the same culpability standard
applied to adults.

198. See Carroll, supra note 165, at 175 (discussing trends favoring transfer of juvenile
offenders to the adult court system); Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Competency To Stand Trial:
Questions in an Era of Punitive Reform, 12 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5–6 (1998) (noting increasing
rates of automatic transfer from juvenile court to adult court as a result of charging
juveniles with higher offenses to qualify them for automatic transfer).
199. See Thomas Grisso, Society’s Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A
Developmental Perspective, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 229, 231 (1996) (describing studies
that find that children, some as young as eleven, are more likely than not to be tried as
adults and to receive the same sentence as an adult).
200. As noted by Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Grisso, states not only transferred
juveniles to the adult court system at younger ages and at higher rates, but they also put
into place minimum sentencing requirements that ensured lengthy sentences, with no
opportunity to offer mitigating evidence. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 190, at 150–51.
Scott and Grisso conclude that this overly punitive approach to juvenile justice “seems to
rest on an assumption of adolescent competence, implicitly holding that there are no
psychological differences between adolescent and adult offenders that are important to
criminal responsibility or to participation in an adult criminal proceeding.” Id. at 151.
201. See supra notes 128–44 and accompanying text. In Roper, and the cases that
followed, the Court followed the suggestion of many juvenile court experts who argued
that youthful immaturity or differences in cognitive function could be adequately
accommodated in sentencing. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1083, 1130–31 (1991); Feld, supra note 190, at 723–24; Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault
Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146, 152 (1989). Other scholars
have argued that youth should also be considered in the context of competency itself, in
particular how immaturity (and its corresponding cognitive deficiencies) might affect the
defendant’s ability to assist counsel. See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence To
Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 334, 359–60 (2003); Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and
Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 247 (2005).
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The Scientific Literature

Beginning in Roper, the Court began to rely—tentatively at
first—on a burgeoning body of scientific literature to support the
notion that children were different than adults.202 By the time the
Court rendered its opinions in Graham and Miller, scientific evidence
had assumed a more central role in the Court’s Eighth Amendment
analysis; children were fundamentally different than adults, and this
fundamental difference rendered them less culpable, at least for the
purposes of punishment. As discussed above, such conclusions were
hardly novel given the Court’s overall jurisprudence of youth or,
indeed, the states’ construction of a distinct system of juvenile justice.
What was unique was the Court’s consideration of scientific data to
support what the Roper Court suggested was an intuitive
conclusion—children were different, and the difference carried legal
significance.
This Section offers an overview of the scientific data that
informed the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, as well as new data
that have developed since. This evidence, like all evidence, is not
without its limitations and challenges. In Part IV, I will consider how
these data can and should inform assessments of mens rea, as well as
the proof problems such data may present as an evidentiary matter.
1. What We Know
Even the recognition of adolescence as a distinct period of
development from childhood or adulthood is both recent and
significant.203 As a developmental period, adolescence extends from

202. Roper was based on the Court’s prior decisions, which did not rely on
neuroscience, and concluded that children, including adolescents, were different than
adults. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). The Court did acknowledge amici
filings that offered a scientific basis for the differentiation, noting that scientific evidence
confirmed the Court’s conclusions and substantiated what “any parent knows”—that
teenagers are immature. See id.
203. From the law’s perspective, this separation of adolescence as a distinct period is a
departure from theories of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that defined
human development only in terms of childhood and adulthood. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The
Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 558–62 (2000) (noting that
early juvenile justice models treated the boundaries between childhood and adulthood as
binary, with little attention paid to the differences between infants and adolescents). This
binary approach created incentives to correlate the boundary between childhood and
adulthood with physical maturity. See id. at 555; Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense
in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 510–13 (1984) (chronicling demarcations
of adulthood in the criminal court system and noting that even under very progressive
systems children were generally deemed responsible, and so adults, at fourteen). While
early theories about adolescent development have been modified and discounted to some
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puberty to the early twenties and is a critical and often volatile bridge
between childhood and adulthood.204 During this period, teens are
more likely both to underappreciate risk and engage in reckless
behavior.205 As researchers attempt to answer the critical question of
why adolescents engage in risky behavior, they map not only the
psychological development of their subjects, but also their physical
development.206 While such research is relatively nascent and leaves
many questions unanswered, an important reality for criminal law
emerges: the reckless behavior and curtailed decision-making
processes of adolescence are the hallmarks of normal development,
not a defect, and they distinguish adolescents from adults.207 This is
not to say that adolescents lack free will, but it is to say that they
engage in different decision-making processes than adults. In this
light, the risky behavior of adolescence, including criminal behavior,
is recast as an important stage of normal development that allows
individuals to understand socially created boundaries and to live
within them.208
Generally, and not surprisingly, studies of adolescence reveal
that teens as a class are less competent decision makers than adults.209
To paraphrase the Roper Court, this hardly comes as a surprise to
anyone who has ever had any contact with a teenager. What renders
these studies more than mere prophecies of the obvious is that they
provide tangible insight into why teens are less competent decision
makers. Whatever question one may have about their usefulness in
extent, see id. at 512–13, the basic premise they assert remains constant—adolescence is a
unique period of development.
204. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 182, at 811.
205. See Sara B. Johnson, Robert W. Blum & Jay N. Giedd, Adolescent Maturity and
the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy,
45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 217–18 (2009); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and
Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 417,
421–22 (2000) (discussing the effect of adolescent brain development on appreciation of
risk); Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking,
28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 83 (2008); Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence, supra
note 187, at 51, 57 (“My argument is that heightened risk taking during this period is likely
to be normative, biologically driven, and inevitable.”). For a discussion of risk taking in
the context of substance abuse among adolescents see Thomas Ashby Wills et al., Novelty
Seeking, Risk Taking, and Related Constructs as Predictors of Adolescent Substance Use:
An Application of Cloninger’s Theory, 6 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE 1, 16–18 (1994).
206. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 182, at 802 (describing adolescent decisionmaking as a product of normal developmental factors).
207. Casey & Caudle, supra note 182, at 82–83 (noting that while it may be
understandable to characterize adolescent behavior as deviant given high rates of mental
health issues and crime during this period, this over-generalization is inaccurate).
208. Id. at 82 (cautioning against pathologizing adolescent behavior).
209. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 182, at 801.
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the legal realm,210 there is no denying their increasing influence on the
Court at least with regard to questions of law.
From these studies some salient themes emerge. Compared to
adults, adolescents demonstrate deficiencies in their capacity for
autonomous and consistent choice,211 self-management,212 risk
perception,213 and the calculation of future consequences.214 They are
210. I will discuss, as others have, the potential limitations of brain science in the legal
context in Section III.B.2, but for excellent additional critiques, see generally Richard J.
Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the Law,
22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 158 (2013) (arguing that “current research
cannot contribute usefully to legal decisions about individual adolescents and should not
be used in criminal trials at the present time, except to provide general developmental
information”); Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 (2009) (arguing that “a more
sophisticated understanding of child development counsels against an approach to
children's law that treats children's capacities at certain ages as ascertainable and fixed.
Instead, the law should recognize the contingent nature of children's capacities”); Terry A.
Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
765 (2011) [hereinafter, Maroney, Brain Science After Graham] (expanding on the
author’s previous article, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (2009), arguing that in light of the Court’s ruling in
Graham, “undue focus on adolescent brain science threatens to obscure more important,
and more treatable, reasons for juvenile offending”); Terry A. Maroney, The False
Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89
(2009) [hereinafter, Maroney, False Promise] (arguing that, “contrary to the high
expectations many have placed on developmental neuroscience, it will—and should—have
fairly modest effects on juvenile justice”); Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro,
Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1, 35 (2009) (arguing against a
“diminished-retribution” model, and instead for a system that is “single-mindedly focused
on the prevention of criminal behavior rather than retributive punishment”).
211. See Beatriz Luna et al., The Teenage Brain: Cognitive Control and Motivation, 22
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 94, 98–99 (2013) (noting that even when
adolescents are capable of exercising control akin to adults, they show less consistency and
less integration of brain processes in decision-making); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent
Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 253–54 (1996).
212. See Casey & Caudle, supra note 182, at 83, 86 (arguing that in emotional contexts
akin to real world situations, impulse control of adolescents is severely taxed relative to
adults or children).
213. See William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents’ AIDS Risk Taking: A
Rational Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS IN THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 17, 25–26 (William
Gardner et al. eds., 1990) (noting that adolescents tend to be less risk averse than adults
and tend to weigh rewards more heavily than risks in making choices); Catherine C. Lewis,
How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy
Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538, 543 (1981). But see Marilyn Jacobs Quadrel, Baruch
Fischoff & Wendy Davis, Adolescent (In)vulnerability, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 102, 111–12
(1993) (noting that adolescents did not exhibit a greater feeling of invulnerability than
adults).
214. See A. L. Greene, Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of Things
Future Revisited, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99, 108–09 (1986) (observing that as
individuals age they are better able to project events into the future).
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more likely to take risks215 and to be sensation seeking.216 They are
more vulnerable to peer influence217 and display heightened responses
to rewards.218 Their personalities and character are in flux.219 Even in
mid-adolescence, as teens’ cognitive capacities approach those of
adults, they are less skilled than their adult counterparts in using
these capacities to make real-life decisions.220 These “deficiencies” in
comparison to adults are not defects, but the products of normal
physiological and psychological development during the adolescent
period.221 As one researcher concluded, the teen brain is not
defective, but “sculpted by both biological and experiential factors to
215. See William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in
ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 66, 67 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993)
(presenting data on age differences in risk taking); Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339 (1992);
Elizabeth S. Scott, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jennifer L. Woolard, Evaluating Adolescent
Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 230 (1995); Steinberg &
Cauffman, supra note 211, at 258–59. Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg suggest that
risk taking may be linked to adolescents’ limited ability to think hypothetically and into
the future, which causes them to value short-term gain or loss disproportionately. See
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 182, at 814; see also Gardner, supra, at 78–79 (positing that a
lack of life experience may account for a willingness to take risks in adolescents).
216. See Arnett, supra note 215, at 342–44. See generally Jeffrey Arnett, Sensation
Seeking: A New Conceptualization and a New Scale, 16 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 289, 289 (1994) (analyzing a study finding that adolescents are more likely
to engage in risk-taking behavior).
217. See Dustin Albert, Jason Chein & Laurence Steinberg, The Teenage Brain: Peer
Influences on Adolescent Decision Making, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 114,
114–15 (2013) (describing heightened susceptibility to peer influence and resulting
increased risky behavior in adolescents); Leah H. Somerville, The Teenage Brain:
Sensitivity to Social Evaluation, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 121, 125
(2013) (noting disproportionate effect of peer reaction on juvenile decision-making
compared to adults).
218. See Adriana Galván, The Teenage Brain: Sensitivity to Rewards, 22 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 88, 89–90 (2013) (noting that adolescents display a heightened
sensitivity to reward as well as an increased dopamine response compared to adults); Luna
et al., supra note 211, at 96–99 (describing studies cataloging adolescents heightened
reward response that may contribute to their failure to properly access risk).
219. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 182, at 801.
220. Luna et al., supra note 211, at 96–99 (noting that even when adolescents show
neural capacities on par with adults, other factors, including external factors such as
susceptibility to peer influence and internal factors such as inefficient decision-making
processes result in poorer decision-making capabilities); see also Shawn L. Ward & Willis
F. Overton, Semantic Familiarity, Relevance, and the Development of Deductive
Reasoning, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 488, 488, 492 (1990) (concluding that while
teens are capable of making decisions that approximate those of their adult counterparts
in familiar settings, their inability to fully engage in deductive reasoning and their limited
experiences render them comparatively poor decision makers in unfamiliar situations).
221. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 182, at 802 (describing adolescent decisionmaking as comparatively compromised as a result of psycho-social immaturity, which is a
product of normal developmental factors).
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adapt to the unique social, physical, sexual, and intellectual challenges
of adolescence.”222 While the timing and the trajectory of
development vary among individuals, the characteristics consistently
manifest across the class.223 The Court in Graham and Miller found
the characteristics to be sufficiently pervasive to justify categorically
excluding one punishment and categorically forbidding mandating
another.224 Likewise, individual variance notwithstanding, these
characteristics are distinct and unique to this period of development,
contributing to immature judgment225 and an increased process of
exploration and experimentation that may include criminal activity.226
In short, if adolescence is characterized as a period of rapid change
and development, what distinguishes it most obviously from
childhood or adulthood is that it is also a time of boundary-pushing
and reckless behavior.
This is hardly breaking news. The wild and thrilling ride of youth
is a glorified and much-documented rite of passage that seems to defy
cultural and geographic boundaries.227 Developmental psychologists
222. B. J. Casey, The Teenage Brian: An Overview, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80 (2013).
223. See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes
to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 9, 24 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
(“Within any given individual, the developmental timetable of different aspects of
maturation may vary markedly . . . . [D]evelopment rarely follows a straight line during
adolescence—periods of progress often alternate with periods of regression.”); Casey et
al., supra note 184, at 119–21 (noting that while brain studies show structural maturity
across a group, individual variance will still exist); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim
Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 408
(2006). As Section III.B.2 will discuss, such variance may create proof problems in the
context of a mens rea analysis, and some have argued such individual differences may limit
the usefulness of neuroscience to legal determinations in general. See, e.g., Maroney, False
Promise, supra note 210, at 146–48; Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 210, at 36–37.
224. See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.
225. See Scott et al., supra note 215, at 229–35 (describing the above-listed
developmental factors as contributing to immature judgment).
226. See Arnett, supra note 215, at 341–44 (describing studies of reckless behavior in
adolescents including drug use, speeding, driving while under the influence, unprotected
sexual activity, and criminal behavior); Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain
Development, and Behavioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 62
(2001) (noting that adolescents are three hundred percent more likely to die or become
disabled than children primarily because they engage in risky behavior).
227. See Arnett, supra note 215, at 339 (noting that “[a]dolescence bears a heightened
potential for recklessness compared to other developmental periods in every culture and
in every time.”). For a less scientific approach to this reality, see generally Amish in the
City (UPN television broadcast, 2004) (a television series documenting the Amish youth in
a rite of passage known as rumspringa which means “running around outside of
boundaries”) or Jersey Shore (MTV television broadcast 2009–2012) (an equally
compelling television series documenting New Jersey youths’ rites of passage in a rented
beach house).
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over the years have offered a variety of explanations for this tendency
toward risky behavior,228 but recent advances in neuroimaging
techniques have fueled a new wave of scientific exploration that
builds on these existing adolescent development theories to suggest a
biological basis for such behavior.229 In particular, longitudinal MRI
studies have not only tracked the structural development of the brain,
but have demonstrated that the brain continues developing well into
early adulthood.230 In particular, researchers note that the frontal
cortex—seat of the powers of executive decision-making,
coordination of emotions and cognition, goal driven planning,
forethought, and impulse control—is the last to achieve structural
maturity.231
MRI studies have also revealed that myelination, the insulation
of neural axons with a fatty substance known as white matter,
increases linearly from childhood to adulthood.232 With this increase
comes a corresponding progression of fast and efficient
communication among brain systems.233 Adolescence also marks a
period of pruning of grey matter—the uninsulated cell bodies and

228. See MARVIN ZUCKERMAN, SENSATION SEEKING: BEYOND THE OPTIMAL LEVEL
10, 122–23 (1979) (describing sensation seeking among teens as a dimension
of their personality characterized by “the need for varied, novel, and complex sensations
and experiences and the willingness to take physical and social risks for the sake of such
experience”); Marvin Zuckerman, Sybil Eysenck & H. J. Eysenck, Sensation Seeking in
England and America: Cross-Cultural, Age, and Sex Comparisons, 46 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 139, 148 (1978) (concluding that adolescents between the ages of
sixteen and nineteen score the highest on the sensation seeking scale with a steady decline
with age).
229. In particular, longitudinal MRI studies enabled researchers to track the structural
development of the brain. See Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood
and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861–62
(1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation
in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860–61 (1999).
230. See B.J. Casey et al., Imaging the Developing Brain: What Have We Learned
About Cognitive Development?, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 104, 104–05 (2005) (noting
that in vivo MRI studies allow researchers to map brain activity and development).
231. See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, RICHARD B. IVRY & GEORGE R. MANGUN,
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 75 (2d ed. 2002); Giedd et al.,
supra note 229, at 862; Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical
Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
8174, 8174 (2004).
232. See Charles A. Nelson III, Kathleen M. Thomas & Michelle de Haan, Neural
Bases of Cognitive Development, in CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 19, 25
(William Damon & Richard M. Lerner eds., 2008); Giedd et al., supra note 229, at 861–62;
Sowell et al., supra note 229, at 860.
233. See Tomáš Paus et al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children and
Adolescents: In Vivo Study, 283 SCIENCE 1908, 1908 (1999).
OF AROUSAL
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synapses of the brain.234 If the period of preadolescence is marked by
a rapid development in the volume of grey matter, adolescence is
notable as a period of change in which the volume and density of this
matter decrease.235 This dual process of myelination and pruning of
grey matter is critical to create more efficient communication
between different parts of the brain.236 These combined processes
allow the adult brain to function quickly and efficiently.237 It is clear
that this development continues throughout adolescence.238 What is
less clear is how this physical immaturity affects behavior or, from the
perspective of criminal law, precisely what impact it has on decisionmaking processes.
It is also clear from the emerging research that the development
from childhood to adulthood, including the period of adolescence, is
transitory and continual.239 As children grow, so too does their
cognitive control.240 An individual’s basic elements of decisionmaking—including
understanding
and
reasoning—increase
throughout childhood and into adolescence.241 Likewise, the
development of connective circuitry through myelination from the
prefrontal cortex and other parts of the brain continues through
adulthood. This change not only facilitates effective decision-making,
but it creates flexibility in the regulation of impulses and decisions.242
Prefrontal connections that emerge in adolescence strengthen into
adulthood.243 In short, as children mature, so too do their basic
information-processing skills along a somewhat steady continuum to
adulthood.

234. See Giedd et al., supra note 229, at 861; Sowell et al., supra note 229, at 860.
235. See Giedd et al., supra note 229, at 861; Sowell et al., supra note 229, at 860.
236. See Paus et al., supra note 233, at 1908.
237. Id.
238. See Nico U. F. Dosenbach, Steven E. Peterson & Bradley L. Schlaggar, The
Teenage Brain: Functional Connectivity, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 101,
104 (2013); Sowell et al., supra note 229, at 860.
239. See Smith, supra note 183, at 310–12; Casey, supra note 222, at 80.
240. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 211, at 260 (noting that both impulsivity
and sensation seeking increase between mid-adolescent years and early adulthood but
decline thereafter).
241. See generally JOHN H. FLAVELL, PATRICIA H. MILLER & SCOTT A. MILLER,
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the advances in deductive reasoning
that occur as children mature into adulthood including the ability to think hypothetically,
abstractly, and multi-directionally as well as the development of metacognition); BARBEL
INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD
TO ADOLESCENCE (1958) (same); JEAN PIAGET, GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY (1970)
(same); ROBERT S. SIEGLER, CHILDREN’S THINKING 5 (2d ed. 1991) (same).
242. See Casey & Caudle, supra note 182, at 84–86; Luna et al., supra note 211, at 99.
243. See Nelson et al., supra note 232, at 19, 25.
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But there are also some developmental findings that are specific
to adolescents, and in the detail of that specificity may lie the devil of
adolescent thought. Adolescents display heightened brain responses
to socially relevant cues.244 Paradoxically, and perhaps cruelly, this
heightened sensitivity to social cues does not render adolescents more
capable of meeting new social challenges; instead it appears that this
sensitivity makes them more subject to peer influences and
pressures.245 In addition, adolescents exhibit a heightened response to
rewards or sensations that seems to dissipate or at least diminish by
adulthood but is also more pronounced than during childhood.246 The
emerging image of adolescence as a period is one of competing neural
and psychological tensions and interactions.247 As the identity and the
brain develop, they do so on trajectories that may ultimately
culminate in adulthood’s mature thought processes and cognitive
abilities, but along the way, distinct functions and paths of
development may drive the brain and the neural systems.248
As the Court reconsidered its Eighth and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence with regard to youth, these studies painted a murky
image of adolescence. Any discussion of teen behavior inevitably
starts with the easily observable and well-documented reality that
adolescents engage in riskier behavior than adults. The more difficult
question, and from the perspective of criminal law the more relevant
question, is why? Emerging research attempts to answer that
question, at least in part, and offers a variety of competing and
complimentary theories. Ultimately, what makes this scientific
evidence important is that it suggests not only that there is a
neurological and psychological explanation for this behavior but also
that the behavior is transitory and a necessary component of
development into adulthood. In short, to borrow from Patti Smith,

244. Casey, supra note 222, at 80.
245. See Albert et al., supra note 217, at 114–15.
246. Id.
247. See Casey & Caudle, supra note 182, at 82, 85 (noting that adolescent decisions
and actions regarding self-control are caused by a “tension within the neural circuitry”
between sections of the brain controlling reward processing and control processing); B.J.
Casey, Sarah Getz & Adriana Galvan, The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV.
62, 63 (2008) (“An accurate conceptualization of cognitive and neurobiological changes
during adolescence must treat adolescence as a transitional developmental period, rather
than a single snapshot in time.”); Dahl, supra note 226, at, 60–72 (2001) (arguing that
adolescent puberty causes limbic system changes effecting responses such as stress
vulnerability and enhanced risk-taking behaviors).
248. See Casey, supra note 222, at 80.
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even the most unruly kids may be all right in the end; they are just
kids.249
2. What We Don’t Know (or the Limits of Science)
As many scholars have cautioned, there are limitations to the
usefulness of neuroscience in criminal law, and courts have been
quick to recognize those limitations.250 First, and perhaps most
critically, while generalizations and trends can be recorded,
neuroscience offers little insight into individual behavior.251 At least in
the context of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, this lack of
individualized accounting has not bothered the Court.252 As the Court
noted repeatedly in the Roper line, the noted behavior and
developmental trends were sufficiently consistent and well
documented to forgo an individualized analysis and to permit a
categorical prohibition of the considered punishments.253
Nonetheless, the Court’s acceptance of a category-based analysis
may prove more challenging in the context of substantive criminal law
for another reason. Studies not only note the variance among
adolescents but also note that biological or neurological realities may
not exclusively control behavior.254 For example, while functional
imaging studies consistently revealed that adolescents lacked fully
mature brains, others suggested that adolescents tended to employ
different brain processes than adults in carrying out identical tasks.255
However, interpreting the behavioral implications of these studies

249. See generally PATTI SMITH, JUST KIDS (2010) (chronicling Smith’s coming of age
with photographer Robert Mappelthorpe and other young artists in the Chelsea Hotel in
the 1960s and 1970s, ultimately concluding that their behavior, much of which was highly
risky, was part of their development process as people and artists).
250. See, e.g., Bonnie & Scott, supra note 210, at 160–61; Buss, supra note 210, at 13,
34–49 (mapping the limitations of brain science in juvenile court); Slobogin & Fondacaro,
supra note 210, at 137–38 (noting limitations on the use of brain science in juvenile
advocacy); Maroney, False Promise, supra note 210, at 118–45 (describing unsuccessful
attempts to use brain science on behalf of juvenile offenders). There are additional
limitations that these critics evoke beyond what I discuss here. They note that brain
science challenges the age limits established by the court and contradicts equality and
autonomy arguments in other contexts. See id. at 152–60.
251. See Maroney, False Promise, supra note 210, at 146–48 (describing the Court’s
reluctance to credit brain studies because they fail to account for individual variations
within the larger population).
252. See supra notes 125–44 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 128–44 and accompanying text.
254. See Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain,
1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 77, 83 (2004); Spear, supra note 205, at 447.
255. See Maroney, False Promise, supra note 210, at 161–63.
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does not always yield concrete conclusions about the juvenile brain.256
Not unrelatedly, studies have shown that while physical maturation of
the brain extends well into early adulthood, by mid-adolescence the
difference in decision-making between teens and adults in lab-like
settings appears to diminish to the point of near irrelevance.257
Moreover, these findings may be discounted by more recent studies
demonstrating that, when placed in settings in which adolescents are
subject to peer pressure or requirements for rapid decisions, they
appear to make riskier, less well-conceived choices than adults, but
these studies also render any categorical conclusion more complex.258
Whether because of these inconsistencies, or perhaps some
greater reluctance to use such category-based assessments to
determine factual questions, courts have been reluctant to rely on
neuroscience outside of sentencing mitigation.259 In those rare
instances in which the courts have used neuroscience outside of
sentencing, scholars have noted confirmation bias—the process by
which the fact finder uses the evidence to confirm preconceptions
about the defendant, rather than to acquire some new
understanding.260
There is no denying the cataloged shortcomings and unanswered
questions of the science. Likewise, time and time again, lower courts
have remained unmoved in the face of scientific evidence challenging
the transfer of juveniles to adult courts,261 the imposition of adult
sentences,262 and the application of adult-calibrated mental states to
juveniles.263 Others have argued that this rejection counsels against
256. Id.
257. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 182, at 812–13, 812 n.55.
258. See Albert et al., supra note 217, at 114–15.
259. See Maroney, False Promise, supra note 210, at 117–59 (cataloging the Court’s
refusal to utilize brain research outside of sentencing mitigation).
260. See Maroney, Brain Science After Graham, supra note 210, at 790–92. As I will
discuss further in Part IV, it may be possible to mitigate such confirmation bias through
judicial instruction regarding adolescent thought processes.
261. See Maroney, False Promise, supra note 210, at 129–32 (listing cases in which
lower courts have rejected neuroscience arguments in opposition to transfer).
262. See, e.g., State v. Zebroski, No. 9604017809, 2010 WL 2224646, at *8–12 (Del. Sup.
Ct. May 14, 2010) (denying petition to overturn death penalty for an eighteen year old
despite the presentation of neuroscience demonstrating his compromised cognitive skills).
263. See, e.g., State v. Torres, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0302-PR, 2010 WL 715994, at *1
(Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010) (rejecting evidence that the defendant was “incapable of
forming the requisite mens rea for first degree murder” and instead applying the adultcalibrated mental state). There has been some limited success in the use of neuroscience,
particularly since the Court’s decisions in Graham and Miller. See, e.g., State v. Bruegger,
773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) (setting aside a statutory rape conviction and stating that
“the reasoning in Roper, namely, that psychosocial and neurological studies show that
juvenile brains are less developed and that, as a result, they are less culpable than adult
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the usefulness or relevance of neuroscience in an assessment of mens
rea, and that it counsels a conservative and circumspect approach to
scientific advocacy in the courtroom.264 As I will discuss in Part IV,
however, logic and justice counsel otherwise.
IV. THE NEXUS OF NEUROSCIENCE AND MENS REA
As an element, mens rea distinguishes behavior and assigns
culpability.265 To accomplish this goal, mens rea must contemplate the
actor’s state of mind at the time of her act—not in the abstract but in
actuality. It must consider what the defendant thought or understood
her actions to mean. Admittedly, this is a complex analysis requiring
fact finders to infer and discern mental states from a defendant’s
actions. In this process, fact finders construct their notions of the
defendant’s mens rea as much from their own thought processes as
from what they know of the defendant’s behavior. They anchor their
judgment of the defendant’s culpability in their own adult decisionmaking processes.
From the perspective of juvenile offenders, this grounding of
mens rea in an adult-referenced standard distorts the thought
processes that adolescents actually engage in. Therefore, while an
adolescent offender may not be deemed as culpable as an adult for
purposes of punishment, he may nonetheless be judged culpable, or
guilty, in the first place based on his ability (or more accurately his
inability) to conform to adult expectations and understandings of the
social norms that undergird criminal law generally and mens rea
particularly.
This is problematic. If mens rea seeks to demarcate culpability
with precision and consistency, then it must accurately reflect what
the defendant understood and the cognitive methodology she
engaged in when arriving at that understanding. The Court has
acknowledged as much in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.266 Its

offenders, has applicability outside the death penalty context”); see also Maroney, Brain
Science after Graham, supra note 210, at 770–73 (providing other examples).
264. See Bonnie & Scott, supra note 210, at 158, 160–61 (noting that current research
cabins adolescents in group data to discuss brain maturation rates, yet this general
information is less helpful in individualized settings that vary in age and development); see
also Maroney, False Promise, supra note 210, at 144–45.
265. See DRESSLER, supra note 11, at § 10.02(c).
266. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (barring the imposition of
mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (barring mandatory life sentences for juveniles for nonhomicide
offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting the execution of

94 N.C. L. REV. 539 (2016)

2015]

BRAIN SCIENCE & JUVENILE MENS REA

591

failure to extend such logic to the element of mens rea creates a gap
between the articulated goal of mens rea and the reality of its
application to youthful offenders. For the mens rea element to serve
its designated role in the criminal justice process as the measure of
guilt, it must reflect the mental state, with all its comparative
cognitive deficiencies, of the adolescent it considers.
To rely on an adult mens rea standard for youthful offenders in
the face of scientific evidence demonstrating that such offenders do
not possess the same cognitive abilities or engage in the same thought
processes as an adult is to undermine mens rea’s value. It effectively
reduces mens rea to a wholly objective analysis that fails even to use a
properly objective standard of comparison. Whatever shortcomings
remain in the current state of scientific knowledge, one principle
remains clear: children are different from adults, and so the
calculation of their mens rea must be different.
In rejecting attempts to apply neuroscience as a basis to alter the
mens rea analysis for juveniles, some courts have contended that such
an alteration would require a legislative change to the criminal code
and therefore exceeds the scope of judicial power.267 For example, in
State v. Heinemann,268 the trial court declined to include a jury
instruction on how adolescent decision-making might affect the
reasonableness of the sixteen-year-old defendant’s actions.269
Heinemann is interesting in that the defendant’s requested instruction
did not mention brain science, but did request that the jury “consider
the age of the defendant, . . . specifically, the level of maturity, sense
of responsibility, vulnerability and personality traits of a sixteen year
old, when deciding his defense of duress.”270 It appears that
Heinemann did not present any scientific evidence to support these
conclusions in his trial, though there is no indication as to whether or
not he attempted to do so.271

juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded).
267. See Maroney, False Promise, supra note 210, at 138–40; Maroney, Brain Science
After Graham, supra note 210, at 770–71.
268. 920 A.2d 278 (Conn. 2007). Heinemann raised what amounted to a duress
defense, claiming that he felt he had little choice but to go along with the criminal activity
initiated by his co-defendants who were older, larger, and armed. Id. at 289–91.
269. Id. at 296–97.
270. Id. at 283.
271. Id. at 284–89 (reciting the evidence presented in support of Heinemann’s defense
of duress and the requested instruction). Ironically, other courts have declined defendants’
requests for an instruction, claiming that such information was common knowledge and
the testimony that supported it only confirmed what anyone who had gone through
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In upholding the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut “acknowledge[d] that juveniles often have more
immature decision-making capabilities and recognize[d] the literature
supporting the notion that juveniles are more vulnerable to all sorts of
pressure, including but not limited to, duress.”272 However, the court
reasoned that granting the defendant’s requested instruction would
“require this court to rewrite the entire Penal Code.”273 In short, the
court concluded that the legislature’s decision to allow a sixteen-yearold defendant to be tried in adult court and its failure to indicate an
alternative mens rea standard to be used for him during that trial
signified that he should be treated as any other defendant and so be
denied the instruction.274
It is hard to tell from Heinemann if the court would have been
more willing to allow this instruction had the defendant not been tried
in adult court or had he presented evidence—even some universal
evidence—to support the claims asserted in his instruction. These
difficulties aside, the logic of the court’s deference to the legislature in
denying
the
instruction
reflects
a
more
fundamental
misunderstanding of the concept of mens rea itself. As discussed in
Part I, mens rea serves a critical role in criminal law by defining and
categorizing culpability according to a defendant’s state of mind.
Interwoven into the very concept of mens rea is an acknowledgement
of the defendant’s thought processes and cognitive function.
Accordingly, the governing legislation has already constructed a legal
standard that would encompass the proposed consideration of
adolescent-specific cognitive processes.275 For courts to allow
testimony regarding an adolescent defendant’s development,
therefore, would not contemplate a legislative modification, but
simply the proper consideration of the existing element.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in J.D.B. supports this
notion. In J.D.B. the Court noted that the suspect’s age is a relevant
component of the objective custody analysis, as it would affect “how a
reasonable person in the suspect’s position ‘would perceive his or her
freedom to leave.’ ”276 While the Miranda decision did not
differentiate between adult and child suspects, in J.D.B. the Court
adolescence already knew. See, e.g., State v. Alford, No. A07-1025, 2008 WL 40006657, at
*5–6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2008).
272. Heinemann, 920 A.2d at 297.
273. Id. at 298–99.
274. Id. at 297–98.
275. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
276. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (citing Stanbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994)).
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found the cognitive attributes and characteristics of juveniles to be
sufficiently distinct as to require a standard of reasonableness that
acknowledged and accounted for this difference.277 In short, the
silence of the standard itself did not undo the pervasive reality that
teens process information and arrive at conclusions in ways that are
not only dictated by their immaturity and their level of development,
but in ways that are different than those of adults.278
In the context of juvenile offenders, neuroscience confirms that
adolescents demonstrate cognitive processes that are distinct from
adult cognitive processes. These studies reveal that teens consistently
and almost routinely engage in behavior that increases their risk of
death or harm,279 and that such risky behavior is a product of
inefficient and underdeveloped cognitive processes that may decrease
as the adolescent’s prefrontal cortex matures and the child becomes
an adult.280 The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
this immature development is sufficiently pervasive to justify
treatment of adolescents as a class for purposes of both Eighth
Amendment culpability281 and Miranda custody analyses.282 More
broadly, this developmental immaturity suggests not only that a
reasonable decision made by an adolescent may be patently
unreasonable to an adult, but also that a given action may signal one
state of mind if taken by an adult and quite another if taken by a
child. For purposes of an objective state of mind analysis, as the Court
concluded in J.D.B.,283 the reasonableness of any particular decision
must be calculated from the perspective of the defendant—the one
277. Id.
278. For an excellent analysis of how the Court’s decision in J.D.B. should affect
application of the felony murder rule to juveniles and duress, justified use of force, and
provocation defenses by juveniles, see generally Marsha L. Levick and Elizabeth-Ann
Tierney, The United States Supreme Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in
J.D.B. v. North Carolina for Purposes of the Miranda Custody Analysis: Can a More
Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 501
(2012) (arguing for the formulation of a “reasonable juvenile standard”). For a discussion
of J.D.B.’s implications for the entrapment defense, see generally Lily N. Katz, Tailoring
Entrapment to the Adolescent Mind, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 94 (2014)
(analyzing the entrapment defense’s application to adolescents).
279. See Laura Kann et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance—United States, 2013,
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., June 13, 2014, at 5–7, 19–23, 28, http://www.cdc
.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6304.pdf [http://perma.cc/UNL6-B6GK] (showing that adolescents
drive after drinking and without seat belts, carry weapons, use illegal substances, and
engage in unprotected sex at an alarming rate).
280. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 128–44 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 170–78 and accompanying text.
283. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011) (holding that a child’s age
should be taken into account as part of the Miranda custody analysis).
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who made the decision in the first place. For purposes of a subjective
state of mind analysis, which will invariably require the fact finder to
draw inferences, the defendant’s decisions and actions must be judged
in light of what the defendant understood them to signify.
Given the criminal law’s treatment of mental state as a measure
of culpability284 and our knowledge of the juvenile brain,285 it is
insufficient to use such knowledge only to mitigate punishment or to
adjust a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness. Such a
limitation fails to address the underlying dilemma that the assessment
of guilt was flawed in the first place through the use of an adult-based
mens rea standard. Indeed, nothing in the Court’s jurisprudence of
youth or in the emerging neuroscience suggests that a one-size-fits-all
mens rea standard is appropriate.
To recognize that adolescent brain science is relevant to mens
rea, however, invites the practical question of what precise role such
science should play in the litigation of a particular criminal case. This
is a problem with no easy solution. The proof or disproof of elements
in a criminal case is a choreographed display premised on the notion
that the competing narratives of prosecution and defense should be
tailored and confined to ever-narrowing circles of relevancy. In the
context of brain science, as discussed above, additional limitations
may present themselves.286
Despite these limitations, at a minimum, what is currently known
from the scientific literature suggests two courses of action. First, to
achieve an accurate assessment of mens rea for juvenile offenders,
courts may not need to alter state of mind terminology, but they do
need to alter the perspective through which that terminology is
interpreted in order to account for differences between juvenile and
adult thought processes. Second, while the Supreme Court is right
that there is a fundamental and understood difference between adults
and juveniles, the analysis offered in the Roper line and in J.D.B.
should be extended to mens rea as this analysis is applicable but is, by
itself, insufficient to support the mens rea element’s full function.
At the most basic level, J.D.B. and the Roper line examined the
significance of juvenile status as a matter of law with regard to
whether or not the protections of the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments required wholesale recalibration for adolescent

284. See supra Sections I.A–B.
285. See supra Section III.B.1.
286. See supra Section III.B.2.
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offenders or suspects.287 To speak of a mens rea analysis, however, is
to speak in terms of matters of fact and the interpretation of those
facts in the face of what the law requires or prohibits. In this, while a
fact finder may be able to recognize a difference between her
behavior as an adult and her behavior as a juvenile, in assessing mens
rea her task is more nuanced—she must not only recognize the
difference, but also the basis of the difference and the significance of
the offender’s behavior in light of those differences. Put another way,
it is a different job to consider whether or not a child is different than
an adult (either for punishment purposes or determination of custody
status) than to consider how an adolescent’s actions should be
interpreted given what is known about adolescent thought processes.
An adult may be able to intuitively recognize that her adult self is
different than her juvenile self, but she may not be able to remember
or even be aware of the thought processes she engaged in as an
adolescent. This requires a more nuanced understanding that may
well defy ordinary knowledge and memory. Here lie the devilish
details. This nuanced understanding of the state of mind is critical to
the function of mens rea as articulated by substantive criminal law—
to weigh the offender’s actual, as opposed to imagined, state of
mind—and it may require guidance to achieve.
As a practical matter, different possibilities emerge to
accomplish mens rea’s function as applied to youthful offenders. Most
obviously, such a defendant could seek to present individualized
evidence of his own thought processes and cognitive function. If a
defendant can access the resources to support such an evaluation, and
it supports his defense, this evidence would seem relevant to factual
question of mens rea. Allowing a defendant to present such evidence,
however, should not be confused with requiring a defendant to
undergo a brain scan in order to successfully mount a science-based
defense that challenges the state of mind element.288 Such a forced
examination not only raises Orwellian-like privacy concerns, but
seems odd given that such an examination would be used to
demonstrate the utter normalcy of the adolescent defendant—as
opposed to his deviation from the norm or any dangerousness or
deficiency that may accompany such deviation.

287. See supra Part II.
288. Such a requirement would likely implicate Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns
against unreasonable searches and self-incrimination. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952) (finding forced stomach pumping to be an illegal search and stating that
government searches that “shock the conscience” are prohibited).
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Given the Court’s willingness in the Roper trilogy and J.D.B. to
accept youthfulness as a universal category—a willingness supported
by the scientific literature—another possibility is that juvenile
defendants should be allowed to present universal neuroscientific
evidence that would demonstrate the traits that “average” or most
juveniles at a like stage of biological development would possess. This
evidence would be akin to that considered by the Court in the Roper
line (and with regard to intellectual disability in the Atkins line).289
While such universal evidence would admittedly provide limited
insight into the particular defendant’s thoughts, it would serve as a
baseline from which fact finders could test the reasonableness of their
own interpretations of the defendant’s actions as it relates to her
mens rea, while avoiding the constitutional and ethical concerns of a
“forced” neuroscientific examination in order to demonstrate that the
defendant was in fact an ordinary teenager (at least as far as his
thought processes go). In addition, by providing the fact finder with
an informed perspective with regard to juvenile thought processes
and linking that perspective to the mens rea calculation specifically,
the risk of confirmation bias may be reduced—although such bias is a
risk even in ideal circumstances.290
Such a reliance on universal evidence to demonstrate inclusion in
the norm may raise the question of relevance, or even necessity. Here
the Court’s own assessment of the fundamental difference between
adults and juveniles is instructive. All fact finders, by legal definition,
are adults.291 They are older than the juvenile offender at the time of
the offense in question. As a result, their own baseline differs from
the relevant baseline of the adolescent they are tasked with judging.
The adolescent’s baseline therefore must be established and cannot
be presumed to be understood or even remembered in ways that it
might be for an adult offender.
As important as such universal evidence is, it is not without
problems. It assumes both a uniformity of cognitive development that
can be determined from the subject’s age and that the presence of
such uniformity will produce discernable and traceable conclusions
289. Compare Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (“As petitioner's amici point out,
developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior
control continue to mature through late adolescence.”), with supra notes 231–51 and
accompanying text (discussing the development of the brain during adolescence).
290. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 534–38 (2002).
291. Juror Qualifications, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/juryservice/juror-qualifications [http://perma.cc/Z6YA-YMMN].
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for the situation the fact finder must now contemplate.292 It is simply
not correct that all sixteen-year-olds who drive drunk universally
understand some reality to be true or universally fail to appreciate
some risk—every single time, all the time. While the literature
suggests that some uniformity exists, it also demonstrates both
developmental variance internal to any given juvenile and the
significant impact that variances in external stimuli can have on
juvenile subjects.293
These limitations do not counsel discarding this universal
evidence, but may support the first proposal of allowing the juvenile
to present evidence of his actual brain function based on his
individual development. While questions regarding the causal link
between the individual’s development and his behavior might linger,
those questions seem no more significant than questions that arise in
the context of the subjective mental state analysis that already occurs
for excuse defenses such as insanity or diminished capacity. This
presentation of defendant-specific brain science not only overcomes
many of the concerns articulated with regard to individualized versus
class-wide development, but it provides an even more precisely
delineated baseline against which the fact finder can judge the
culpability of the defendant’s actions.294 In this, courts would not
necessarily need to alter state of mind terminology; rather, as
suggested here, they may simply need to alter the perspective through
which that terminology is interpreted in order to account for
differences between juvenile and adult thought processes.
292. Some have argued that reliance on neuroscience may provide limited insights into
the defendant’s state of mind. They both point to individual differences in development
and question the link between behavior and development itself. See, e.g., Teneille Brown
& Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a
Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1119, 1150–51 (2010)
(arguing that MRI technology “may present a particularly strong form of unfair prejudice
in addition to its potential to mislead jurors and waste the court’s resources”). But see
Sally Terry Green, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony Based on Adolescent
Brain Imaging Technology in the Prosecution of Juveniles: How Fairness and Neuroscience
Overcome the Evidentiary Obstacles To Allow for Application of a Modified Common
Law Infancy Defense, 12 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 1, 1–2, 8, 21–22 (2010) (“Offering adolescent
brain research as part of an Infancy Defense model provides juveniles with an opportunity
to combat harsher penalties imposed by the states and facilitates imposition of legal
standards that require consideration of the differences between children and adults.”).
293. See discussion supra Sections III.B.1–2.
294. The admission of either the universal or individualized evidence may present
evidentiary challenges initially, both with regard to relevancy and qualification as sound
science under Daubert or Daubert-equivalent threshold inquiries. While I acknowledge
this, further discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of this issue, and
proposed remedies, see generally Green, supra note 292 (examining the evidentiary
standard for the admissibility of scientific data).
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In each of these suggestions, I am not asserting either that
adolescent offenders are categorically incapable of achieving any
particular mens rea or should be rendered blameless by their
immaturity. Quite the contrary—I am arguing that, like all offenders,
adolescents should be held accountable for the mens rea they actually
achieved. Or perhaps more accurately, they should be held
accountable for the mens rea that the state can prove they achieved
through the fact finding process. In this regard, the accuracy of the
fact finder’s calibration is critical.
Larger questions regarding how this evidence should be
presented, what burdens for proof or persuasion should attach to it,
and how defenses would be modified by it, admittedly linger. This
Article cannot hope to address them all, at least not if it hopes to
maintain any sort of fidelity to word count limitations. But it does aim
to open a conversation that scholars, practitioners, and courts seem to
have discouraged to date: that the current state of neuroscience on
juvenile brain development renders the application of an adultreferenced standard inappropriate. Instead juvenile offenders’ actions
must be judged through the lens of their age-calibrated thought
processes and cognitive abilities. This Article starts that conversation.
CONCLUSION
The neuroscientific advances described have a great deal to say
about how the criminal justice system should treat juvenile offenders.
The Supreme Court’s embrace of this science in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is a very important step forward. In Miller
v. Alabama, Graham v. Florida, and Roper v. Simmons, the Court has
relied on evidence of juvenile brain development to conclude that life
without the possibility of parole and death sentences violate the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Likewise in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court relied on
neuroscience to hold that the imposition of the death penalty on
mentally retarded defendants violated the Eighth Amendment. These
cases confirm the Court’s willingness to consider neuroscience when
assessing the culpability of particular classes of defendants in
determining appropriate and proportional punishment.
Despite this willingness, advocates have achieved little success in
utilizing neuroscience outside the context of punishment mitigation.
In the face of this judicial reluctance and the admitted limitations of
the science itself, scholars have counseled towards curtailment and
caution—suggesting a limited role for science in juvenile advocacy.
But this conservative approach undermines the value of the science
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and is logically inconsistent with criminal law’s reliance on the
defendant’s mental state as a measure of guilt and blameworthiness.
The continued allegiance to adult-calibrated mens rea standards
in the face of scientific confirmation that adolescents utilize different
cognitive processes than adults perverts mens rea’s essential purpose.
The fact finder’s subjective determination of the defendant’s state of
mind requires a careful calculation of what the defendant thought as
he acted. The continued reliance on a one-size-fits-all categorization
of mens rea and its corresponding rejection of scientific evidence
assumes an adult-centric uniformity. The use of this adult standard of
mens rea in assessing the guilt of adolescent offenders flies in the face
of the most fundamental conclusion currently available from the
study of adolescent development—that the thought processes and
cognitive abilities of adults and teens are profoundly and qualitatively
different. A just system of determining criminal culpability must
account for these differences in assessing an adolescent’s mens rea.
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